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ABSTRACT
I evaluate the practical utility of psychological bias theory by examining two historical
cases - the US decision to cross the 38th parallel in 1950 and the British policy of
appeasement towards Germany in the 1930s - asking in each of these whether the
theory could have helped policymakers to make better decisions.
Drawing from the lessons of these two cases, I argue that psychological bias theory can
help foreign-policymakers to improve their decisionmaking capabilities and hence
increase their chances of achieving favorable outcomes in international politics.
However, even if the prescriptions of the theory are adopted, there is no guarantee that
positive outcomes will obtain in every case because outcomes are affected by at least two
other factors that one largely cannot control: the availability of information and the
misperceptions suffered by one's opponent.
I also discuss other research methods that could be used to investigate the utility of the
theory: examining how useful its prescriptions have been; looking at whether people can
actually correct their psychological biases; and considering whether policymakers should
attempt to rectify their biases.
Thesis Supervisor: Stephen Van Evera
Title: Professor of Political Science
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7Introduction
In this essay, I evaluate the practical utility of psychological bias theory - that
body of literature that emphasizes that foreign-policymakers, like all people, are subject
to various cognitive constraints when they make decisions. This aim of this paper, in
other words, is to ask how useful this theory is to policymakers. I start by describing my
motivations for this essay, after which I carefully outline the assumptions, explanations,
and prescriptions of the theory. I then turn to two historical cases and ask in each of these
whether psychological bias theory could have helped policymakers to make better
decisions. In the last section of the essay, I discuss further research methods that could
help us to explore the utility of psychological bias theory. As we shall see, psychological
bias theory offers prescriptions that can potentially help policymakers to achieve better
outcomes for their states in the international arena, though there is no guarantee that it
can do so in every case because there at least two factors besides psychological biases
that affect foreign policy success: the availability of information and the misperceptions
suffered by one's opponents.
Motivations
At times, International Relations' theorists and foreign-policymakers appear to
exist in two separate universes. Compared to other social science disciplines - e.g.
economics, geography, and sociology - IR has made little impact on the actual making
of policy. Relative to other subfields within political science, too, IR has been slighted by
policymakers. This lamentable state of affairs has not gone unnoticed among IR scholars.
I follow the convention of using the phrase "International Relations" (abbreviated as IR), with capital
letters, to refer to the academic discipline, and the phrase "international relations", with lower-case letters,
to refer to the subject matter of that discipline. It is interesting to note that this convention appears to be
somewhat more prevalent among British scholars than American ones.
8Stephen Walt, for example, writes that "despite the need for well-informed advice about
contemporary international problems...there has long been dissatisfaction [among
policymakers] with the contributions of IR theorists."2 James Kurth similarly comments,
"[IR] practitioners are not only rightly ignored by practical foreign policy officials; they
are usually held in disdain by their fellow academics as well."3 One Indian scholar wryly
notes that at mixed gatherings, IR scholars usually crowd around decisionmakers, hoping
to receive crumbs of their wisdom - rather than the other way around.4
Those on the policy side of the fence have also voiced their discontent with the
usefulness of IR theory. Paul Nitze, one of the chief architects of US Cold War doctrine,
and who was also familiar with the academic world, stated that "most of what has been
written and taught under the heading of 'political science' by Americans since World
War II has been contrary to experience and to common sense. It has also been of limited
value, if not counterproductive, as a guide to the actual conduct of policy."5 David
Newsom, a former US Undersecretary of State and ambassador, remarks that "much of
today's scholarship [on international politics] is either irrelevant or inaccessible to
policymakers...the results of much research remains locked within the community of
scholars."6 One indication of the short shrift given to IR theory by those responsible for
the making of foreign policy is the fact that, in the United States, being a prominent IR
theorist is neither sufficient nor necessary for appointment to the National Security
2 Stephen Walt, "The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations", Annual Review
of Political Science 8 (2005), 24.
3 James Kurth, "Inside the Cave: the Banality of I.R. Studies", The National Interest 53 (Fall 1998), 29.
Kurth does admit a few exceptions to his charge that IR theories are barren from a practical perspective,
including the works of John Mearsheimer, Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, Stephen Walt, and Robert Gilpin.
4 Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya, A General Theory of International Relations (New Delhi: Allied
Publishers, 1992), 1
5 Paul Nitze, Tension Between Opposite: Reflections on the Practice and Theory of Politics (New York:
Scribner, 1993), 15.
6 David Newsom, "Foreign Policy and Academia", Foreign Policy 101 (Winter 1995), 65.
9Council, the Department of State, or other similar foreign-policymaking bodies. (It is
instructive to compare this situation with that of the President's Council of Economic
Advisors, which is populated by economics PhDs).7
Numerous reasons have been advanced for this theory-policy gap. One prominent
suggestion is that the vast majority of IR scholars do not conduct their research with
policy relevance in mind. This is in large part because the incentives and norms of
academia do not point in that direction. Budding academics are professionally rewarded
for work that speaks (whether in support or in opposition) to established paradigms
within the discipline, not for research that addresses real world issues faced by
policymakers. As Newsom, the former diplomat, complains, "Academicians often appear
caught up in an elite culture in which labels, categories, and even the humor have
meaning for 'members only'. Their writings are filled with references to other scholars'
writings; they speak to each other rather than to a wider public."8
This is an unfortunate situation, and a misguided one. IR has much to say about
foreign-policymaking. When a state takes a particular course of action in the international
arena, its leaders are usually implicitly relying on a theory of international relations that
has already been debated by IR scholars. IR theory has the potential to provide the
scientific knowledge for better decisionmaking. As Philip Zelikow argues, "the
comparative advantage of academics is that they have the general knowledge,
7 Walt, "Theory and Policy in IR", 24.
8 Newsom, "Foreign Policy", 62. James Kurth similarly comments that "most academics are only
concerned about the good opinion of about a dozen other academic specialists in their particular sub-sub-
field" 8, while Robert Jervis observes that academics often act like Winnie-the-Pooh and his companions,
who thought that they were in close pursuit of an ever-growing number of Woozles when in fact they were
only following their own tracks. See Kurth, "Inside the Cave", 33; and Robert Jervis, "Cumulation,
Correlation and Woozles", in ed. James Rosenau, In Search of Global Patterns (Glencoe: Free Press,
1976).
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disciplinary training, and opportunity to provide the needed analysis."9 Alexander George
writes that "foreign policy must be based on sound analysis of the characteristics and
dynamics of the international system, the nature of adversaries, the way in which various
instruments of policy can be appropriately and effectively employed in pursuit of foreign-
policy objectives, etc."'° IR theory has the potential to provide that sort of analysis.
One important way of increasing the extent to which IR theory is utilized by
policymakers is to have greater and more explicit discussion of the extent to which
particular IR theories are applicable to foreign-policymaking. In other words, if greater
policy relevance is deemed a worthy goal, then we as IR theorists should increase our
tendency to explicitly ask, 'To what extent could such-and-such theory actually be used
by policymakers?'
This essay intends to be a modest step in that direction. I take a particular theory
within IR, and perform, as it were, an audit of its prescriptive utility. (This essay is thus
an instance of what Stephen Van Evera calls a "literature-assessing" or "stock-taking"
dissertation.' 1) Specifically, I examine what might be called 'psychological bias
theory'.12 The essence of this theory is that policymakers, like all people, are subject to
various cognitive constraints, which means that decisionmaking is almost never
9 Philip Zelikow, "Foreign Policy Engineering: From Theory to Practice and Back Again", International
Security 28:4 (Spring 1994), 146.
10 Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking i Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and
Advice (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 240.
Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1997), 90. Van Evera laments the fact that "political science field culture is biased toward the creation and
testing of theory over other work, including.. .the stock-taking of literature." (Guide to Methods, 4).
12 What I refer to here as 'psychological bias theory' is often referred to by other names, such as 'political
psychology', 'cognitive constraint theory', 'decisionmaking theory', 'cognitive psychology', the
'psychological paradigm', and so on.
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characterized by the pure rationality posited by rational choice theory.13 In other words,
any realistic model of, or guide to, foreign-policymaking must take into account the fact
that foreign-policymakers are human beings and thus subject to a host of psychological
limitations when they make decisions. Unlike earlier work that applied psychology to
international relations, psychological bias theory does not concentrate on psychological
abnormalities suffered by a small number of leaders such as Hitler, Stalin, and Mao;
instead, psychological bias theory emphasizes those cognitive limitations to which even
intelligent and mentally healthy people are subject.14
Why psychological bias theory?
I do not contend that there is at present universal - or even majority - assent
among IR theorists to the propositions advanced by psychological bias theory. As Jack
Levy observes, there is too little evidence at the moment to tell whether political
psychology or its chief rival, rational choice theory, possesses superior explanatory
power with respect to foreign-policymaking. 15 (The two theories are often seen as rivals
because they both focus on the individual level of analysis to explain foreign policy
outcomes.) In fact, it is probably right to say that IR theorists in recent years have
embraced rational choice theory to a much greater degree than psychological bias theory.
Levy (writing in 1997) observes that "rational choice has become the most influential
13 Jack Levy, "The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace", Annual Review of Political Science 1
(1998), 157; Michael Brecher, "International Studies in the Twentieth Century and Beyond: Flawed
Dichotomies, Synthesis, Cumulation", International Studies Quarterly 43:2 (June 1999), 230-233; Ole
Holsti, "Theories of International Relations ", in eds. Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson, Explaining the
History ofAmerican Foreign Relations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 77.
14 Holsti, "Theories of International Relations", 76.
15 Jack Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations", International Studies
Quarterly 41:1 (March 1997), 108. Similarly, Michael Brecher similarly notes that "the vigorous debate
between rational choice theory and its critics [particularly psychological bias theory] goes on. See Brecher,
"International Studies", 231.
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paradigm in international relations and political science over the last decade."'6
According to Kurth, rational choice theory and postmodernist theory - i.e., not
psychological theory - have overthrown neorealism and neoliberalism as the dominant
paradigms in IR.17
When Robert Jervis published his landmark Perception and Misperception in
International Politics, probably the most important oeuvre in the psychological bias
literature, in 1976 the prominent psychologist Robert Abelson predicted a "new wave in
political science[:] the application of psychology concepts.. .to the situations confronting
decisionmakers."l8 It would be a stretch to say that this prediction has come true.
However, this does not invalidate the purpose of the present essay. Since my principal
aim here is to present a model for similar audits of prescriptive utility'9 , the truth of the
particular theory analyzed is less important than the way in which we examine its
practical significance. As such, I do not enter into the vast debate over whether the basic
tenets of psychological bias theory are true; for the purposes of this essay, I assume that
they are.
Psychological bias theory also possesses a number of advantages relevant to our
present goals. First, psychological bias theory seems - at first glance, anyway - to have
prescriptive potential because it attributes errors in foreign-policymaking to a factor
(misperception) that could be amenable to manipulation and reduction. As Van Evera
points out, "A theory gains prescriptive richness by pointing to manipulable causes, since
16 Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice", 87.
17 Kurth, "Inside the Cave", 37.
is Quoted in Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976), outside back cover.
19 cf. Chaim Kaufman, who tests psychological explanations of decisionmaking using a single case, with
the larger aim of providing a model for further research along similar lines. see Chaim Kaufman, "Out of
the Lab and into the Archives: A Method for Testing Psychological Explanations of Political Decision
Making", International Studies Quarterly 38:4 (Dec. 1994), 558.
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manipulable causes might be controlled by human action."2 0 Second, those who study
psychological bias are usually quite willing to offer prescriptions on how to reduce the
impact of those biases and hence make better decisions.21 This makes it slightly easier to
evaluate whether or not the theory is practically useful.
Besides, at least some scholars agree that psychological bias theory - or theories
related to it - will increase in prominence within IR in the short-term future. Levy thinks
that prospect theory (a particular variant of psychological bias theory) is becoming an
important challenge to rational choice theory22; Van Evera argues that misperception
holds the key to explaining many international political outcomes23; and Valerie Hudson
points out that the end of the Cold War has engendered renewed interest in IR theories
focusing on the individual level of analysis.2 4 In other words, psychological bias theory
remains at least a viable research program.
Finally, before proceeding to an explanation of psychological bias theory, I
concede that by concentrating on policy implications and practical applicability, there is a
danger that theoretical superficiality and intellectual shallowness will be allowed to creep
in. Hedley Bull argues (probably with some truth) that "the search for conclusions that
20 Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 21. Cf. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1959), 41.
21 See, for example, Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 409-424; George, Presidential Decisionmaking,
137-260; Richard Ned Lebow, "The Deterrence Deadlock: Is There a Way Out?", in Robert Jervis, Richard
Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1985); Irving Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and
Commitment (New York: Free Press, 1977), 339-404; Yaacov Vertzberger, The World in Their Minds.
Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1990), 342-362.
22 Levy, "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice".
23 Stephen Van Evera, More Causes of War: Misperception and the Roots of Conflict (unpublished ms.,
2001).
24 Valerie Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-specific Theory and the Ground of International
Relations", Foreign Policy Analysis 1 (2005), 13.
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can be presented as 'solutions' or 'practical advice' is a corrupting element in the
contemporary study of world politics... such conclusions are advanced less because there
is any solid basis for them than because there is a demand for them which it is profitable
to satisfy."2 5 But considering that the balance in IR is at present heavily titled in favor of
theoretical concerns and away from practical ones, I think that there is no risk in the
foreseeable future that an increased emphasis on policy in IR will result in a dilution of
the field's theoretical rigor.
Psychological Bias Theory
There are numerous scholars whose work can be characterized as psychological
bias theory. In this essay, I adopt the simplifying procedure of mainly (though not
exclusively) focusing on the work of one particular author: Robert Jervis, arguably the
most important and most frequently cited scholar in this subfield.26 (Thus, in this essay,
when I say 'psychological bias theory', it usually means 'Robert Jervis's version of
psychological bias theory'.) Furthermore, I concentrate primarily on Perception and
Misperception in International Politics, Jervis's most comprehensive treatment of the
topic, though I shall also draw on his other writings as needed.
Assumptions
I begin by setting out briefly the assumptions that are contained in psychological
bias theory. Knowing a theory's assumptions is central to assessing its practical utility.
Though some scholars argue that a positive theory should be judged on the accuracy of
25 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society, 3 rd ed. (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), 308.
26 Stephen Van Evera, personal correspondence. See also Stephen Van Evera, More Causes of War, 10.;
Arthur Stein, "When Misperception Matters", World Politics 34:4 (Jul. 1982), 505; Vertzberger, World in
Their Minds, 17.
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its predictions rather than on the truth of its assumptions27 , it is arguable that the
assumptions of a theory must bear at least some resemblance to reality in order for it to
be useful for policymakers.
Psychological bias theory makes three major assumptions:
(Al) The individual level of analysis matters. Psychological bias theory assumes
that individual policymakers have a significant influence on the way in which states
behave, and therefore, that explanation of state behavior cannot proceed without
reference to individual policymakers. As Ole Holsti puts it, the assumption is that "to
reconstruct how nations deal with each other, it is necessary to view the situation through
the eyes of those who act in the name of the state." 28
Policymakers are likely to think that this assumption is obviously true, but the so-
called 'level-of-analysis' debate has in fact been one of the major areas of contention
within IR over the past four decades.29 Many theorists who espouse the systemic level of
analysis argue that individual level factors are unnecessary in explaining the way in
which states behave.30 I do not wish to enter into this complicated debate here. For my
purposes, I am content to observe that psychological bias theory assumes that the
individual level of analysis has at least some explanatory power vis-A-vis state behavior.
Psychological bias theory, it should be noted, does not necessarily assume that the
individual level of analysis is the only one that matters.31 Psychological bias theory
concedes that factors at the systemic and domestic-political levels may play a role in
27 see esp. Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics", in eds. Michael Martin and Lee
McIntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).
28 Holsti, "Theories of International Relations", 70.
29 Brecher, "International Studies", 228-230.
30 See esp. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
31 For example, in discussing the other levels of analysis, Jervis asserts only that they are insufficient for
explaining international political outcomes; he does not argue that they are unnecessary. See Jervis,
Perception and Misperception, 18-28.
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determining state behavior; it contends merely that individual-level factors are also
important.
(A2) Psychological biases lead to misperceptions.32 Psychological bias theorists
in IR usually model policymakers as information-processing systems.33 That is,
policymaking can be broken down into three interrelated stages: (1) the gathering and
interpretation of information; (2) the evaluation of alternative courses of action, based on
the information interpreted in the previous step and a calculation of relative costs and
benefits; and (3) the implementation of the course of action chosen in the previous step.34
Psychological bias theory holds that various psychological biases influence the gathering
and interpretation of information (stage 1), which somehow impairs the rational
evaluation of alternative courses of action (stage 2). In other words, psychological biases
lead to misperceptions.
(A3) Perceptions (including misperceptions) affect foreign policy outcomes. The
third assumption of psychological bias theory is that the perceptions of individual
foreign-policymakers - especially their perceptions of other states' intentions and
behavior - have a significant influence on the foreign policies that states adopt.
Perceptions and beliefs are assumed to be a crucial determinant of the way in which
states' leaders behave, which (by assumption Al) is an important factor in how states act.
In Jervis's words, psychological bias theory posits that "it is often impossible to explain
32 Perhaps it is more accurate to describe this proposition as the central thesis of psychological bias theory,
rather than as one of its assumptions.
33 George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 56; Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 7-8. George observes (in
1980) that viewing the mind as an information-processing system is one of the "fundamental tenets of
cognitive psychology". However, as Margaret Matlin notes, many cognitive psychologists have challenged
the information-processing approach in recent years. See Margaret Matlin, Cognition, 6 ed. (Hoboken:
John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 11-12.
34 Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 7-8.
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crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers' beliefs about the
world and their images of others."35
Jervis summarizes the three assumptions of psychological bias theory as follows:
"Many of the propositions advanced [by psychological bias theory]... are generalizations
about how decision-makers perceive others' behavior and form judgements about their
intentions. These patterns are explained by the general ways in which people draw
inferences from ambiguous evidence and, in turn, help explain many seemingly
incomprehensible policies."36 The overall model of state behavior posited by
psychological bias theory can be expressed, then, in the following diagram:
Fig. 1. Psychological Bias Theory's Model of State Behavior
Psychological Biases
I turn now to the various psychological biases posited by psychological bias
theory. Following Yaacov Vertzberger, we can characterize biases as "deviations in
judgment that are consistent and predictable."37 Psychological bias theory distinguishes
between two types of biases, depending on their source: (1) unmotivated biases
(sometimes called cognitive biases); and (2) motivated biases.38 I discuss these in turn.
35 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 28.
36 Ibid., 29.
37 Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 144.
38 Note: Jervis does not distinguish between these two types of biases in Perception and Misperception, but
does so in subsequent work. See, for example, Robert Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat", in
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Unmotivated (or Cognitive) Biases
Unmotivated biases arise, in Jervis's account, because the "problem of dealing
with complex and ambiguous information leads people to adopt short-cuts to rationality
that simplify perceptions in order to make more manageable the task of making sense out
of environments."39 In other words, decisionmakers frequently find themselves facing
difficult and complicated situations where information is limited and ambiguous. They
must deal with these situations using inherently limited cognitive capabilities. Thus, they
often turn to cognitive short-cuts in order to make the task more manageable. As
cognitive psychologist Robert Sternberg explains, "These mental shortcuts lighten the
cognitive load of making decisions, but they also allow for a much greater chance of
error."40
Psychological bias theory in IR identifies a number of unmotivated biases that
affect, sometimes adversely, the way in which foreign policy is made:
(B1) Assimilation of new information to pre-existing beliefs (sometimes known as
theory-driven thinking or cognitive dispositions). The beliefs that a person holds has a
significant impact on the way in which he perceives and interprets new information.41
When one encounters information that fits well with one's pre-existing beliefs, one is
likely to notice that information, accept it, and incorporate it into one's store of
knowledge. When, on the other hand, one encounters information that is discrepant to
what one already believes, that information is likely to be ignored, misperceived,
Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1985); Robert Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception", Iternational Security 7:3
(Winter 1982-1983), 15; Robert Jervis, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence", World Politics 41:2
(Jan. 1989), 196-197.
39 Robert Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat", 18.
40 Robert Steinberg, Cognitive Psychology, 3 rd ed. (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2003), 409.
41 As Jervis writes, "Our perceptions are strongly colored by our beliefs about how the world works and
what patterns it is likely to present us with." See Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat", 18.
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dismissed as an aberration, or interpreted in a distorted manner such that it does not
contradict one's prior beliefs.
According to Jervis, this phenomenon is "probably the most pervasive and
significant" of the various unmotivated biases.4 2 While this bias is sometimes useful-
indeed, without it, it would be very difficult for decisionmakers to organize and make
sense of the kaleidoscope of information that they receive every day - it can often have
negative consequences on the formulation of foreign policy. The problem is that this bias
causes statesmen to maintain their beliefs and theories even in the face of large amounts
of discrepant information, since any discrepant information is likely to be unperceived,
dismissed, discounted, or distorted. In many cases, this leads even generally intelligent
foreign-policymakers to maintain beliefs - most importantly, beliefs about other states
- that, in retrospect, were clearly contradicted by the available evidence. This bias helps
to explain, for example, why the US completely failed to predict the 1973 Arab-Israeli
war. Numerous pieces of information that may have alerted US (and Israeli) leaders to
the imminent Arab attack were ignored or distorted; for instance, the evacuation of Soviet
civilians from Syria a few days before the attack was misinterpreted by US leaders as
evidence that the Soviet Union and Arab states had fallen out with one another - an
interpretation that Henry Kissinger, who was then Secretary of State, later admitted to be
absurd.4 3
Particularly dangerous are situations in which state leaders hold an 'inherent bad
faith model' of another state, i.e. they believe that state to be fundamentally hostile and
42 Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception", 24.
43 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 144.
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malevolent.44 In such cases, seemingly hostile actions by the opponent are seized upon as
evidence for the image of that opponent as vicious and belligerent, while seemingly
conciliatory actions are ignored, discredited or otherwise twisted to conform to the image.
(For example, as Ole Holsti shows, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles interpreted any
Soviet move that was prima facie conciliatory as either a deceptive maneuver or an action
compelled by weakness.45 ) Inherent bad faith models not only make it much more
difficult for two states that are negatively disposed each other to move towards a
reduction in hostilities, but they also increase the risk of hostility spirals: when State A
attempts to make conciliatory gesture s towards State B, these are likely to be dismissed
or misinterpreted by State B, but since State A believes that it has been conciliatory, it
may take the lack of positive response on the part of State B as an affront and hence
increase its antagonism towards State B, provoking a hostile reaction from State B, and
so on.4 6
At other times, the resistance of established beliefs to change may prevent
policymakers from shifting to more successful policies. For a long time after the start of
World War I, military strategists persisted in launching massive infantry charges due to
their belief in the superiority of offensive strategies, in spite of the fact that such charges
were blatantly ineffective and led to enormous numbers of soldiers being killed. (This
case has led Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz to comment, "Men may die easily, but beliefs
do not."4 7)
44 George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 65.
45 Ole Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia", in David Finlay, Ole
Holsti and Richard Fagen, Enemies in Politics (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1967).
46 See Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 67-76.
47 Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz, "Technology, Strategy, and the Uses of Force", in eds. Robert Art and
Kenneth Waltz, The Use of Force (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983), 13.
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(B2) Influence of historical analogies. In making decisions, statesmen often rely
on comparisons with past events as guides to choosing between alternative policies. New
situations that confront policymakers are often difficult to assess, and historical analogies
are frequently used as aides in diagnosing and dealing with the current situation. For
example, when Truman was informed of the North Korean invasion of South Korean in
June 1950, he employed the historical cases of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, the
German annexation of Austria, and the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in making his
decision to send American forces to repel the North Korean attack.48 As historian Ernest
May notes, "Eagerness to profit from the lessons of history is the one characteristic
common in the statecraft of such diverse types as Stanley Baldwin, Adolf Hitler, Harry
Truman, Charles de Gaulle, and John F. Kennedy."4 9
The use of historical cases as a guide to decisionmaking is not in itself a bad
thing. There are valuable lessons to be learned from history 50; indeed, much of political
science scholarship is based on this notion. The problem is that policymakers tend to be
unconsciously selective about the historical analogies that they employ. More often than
not, the historical cases that are relied upon are those that are the most recent, the most
dramatic, or ones that the policymakers have themselves experienced.5 This can be a
problem because there is no a priori reason why these categories of historical cases
should provide the best guides to understanding the present situation. They often are not:
48 Harry Truman, Memoirs, vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday, 1956), 332-33.
Discussed in Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 218.
49 Ernest May, "The Relevance of Diplomatic History to the Practice of International Relations" (Paper
given at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 1965), quoted in George,
Presidential Decisionmaking, 43.
50 Though see Keith Robbins, Munich 1938, (London: Cassell, 1968), 4-5 for an alternative view.
51 As Abraham Lowenthal writes, "Policy-makers seize on evils they have experienced and wish to avoid in
order to organize their information about events they do not have the time to analyze from scratch." See
A.F. Lowenthal, The Dominican Intervention (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 161.
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as Michael Roskin shows, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor 'taught' the next generation
of US leaders that the US must relinquish its isolationist stance and be prepared to
intervene, military or otherwise, wherever it feels that aggression is budding; this 'lesson'
led directly to the disastrous American experience in Vietnam.52
(B3) Misestimating one 's role in causing other's actions.53 States often
misperceive the extent to which their own policies are responsible for causing other
states' actions. Whether overestimation or underestimation occurs depends on whether
the other state's action is seen as favorable or harmful to the first state's interests.
When the action taken by State B is beneficial to State A, State A is likely to
overestimate the extent to which that action was brought about by its own policies - e.g.
its threats and reassurances - and thus underestimate the extent to which that action was
caused by other factors such as domestic politics, the domestic economy, third-party
states, and State B's autonomous decisions. As Jervis writes, "When the other behaves in
accord with the actor's desires, he will overestimate the degree to which his policies are
responsible for the outcome." Hence, it is often the case that a state thinks it is
responsible for causing another state's positive actions when in fact the other state is
acting for other reasons. For example, during the Opium War, the Chinese perceived
every favorable British move as having been caused by Chinese policy, when in reality
the British behaved as they did largely for other reasons.5 4
52 Michael Roskin, "From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: Shifting Generational Paradigms and Foreign Policy",
in ed. G. John Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays, 4" ed. (New York: Longman,
2002).
53 Jervis calls this bias, confusingly, "Overestimating One's Importance" in Jervis, Perceptions and
Misperceptions, Chapter 9, even though the bias leads states to underestimate their own role when others
act in hostile ways. Jervis's explanation that in such cases states are actually overestimating their own
importance - albeit as targets - is unconvincing.
54 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 343, 344.
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On the other hand, when State B's action is harmful to State A, State A is likely to
underestimate its own role in causing that action, and overestimate the role of other
factors. Jervis writes, "When the other's behavior is undesired, the actor is likely to see it
as derived from internal sources rather than as being a response to his own actions." 55
Often, this means that when State B takes a hostile action towards State A, State A will
fail to realize that it has done something to provoke that hostile action - or, at least, that
the action was taken out of fear of State A - and instead interpret the action as evidence
that State B is inherently hostile toward State A.
This dual bias can give rise to numerous sorts of problems. The propensity to
overestimate one's role in bringing about positive actions on the part of others can hinder
cooperation because a state will often miss signs that another state is friendly,
(mis)interpreting those signs instead as evidence that its own efforts to compel are
working. The other half of the bias is perhaps even worse because it can trigger spirals of
hostility: When State A fails to see that State B acted in an apparently hostile manner out
of fear of State A, it is likely to react aggressively towards State B, who will in turn react
belligerently to State A (because State B, believing that its first action was a defensive
one, will attribute State A's aggressive action to inherent belligerence), and so on. Even if
State A does not react aggressively in the first 'round', the chances for cooperation are
diminished because State A will neglect the possibility of positively influencing the
other's behavior through reassurances or moderation of its own actions; after all, if State
B is inherently hostile, there is no need for State A to critically examine its own actions.
(B4) Belief that the other side understands that you are not a threat. This bias is
closely related to the last one. Actors tend to underestimate the extent to which the other
55 Ibid., 343.
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side feels threatened by them. Thus, when a state thinks that it has nothing but peaceful
intentions towards another state, it often wrongly assumes that the other state knows this
as well. As Jervis writes, "When an actor believes he is not a threat to another, he usually
assumes that the other knows he is not hostile."5 6 Even when a state understands that its
pacific intentions must be somehow conveyed, it usually underestimates the difficulties
that it faces in getting other states to believe this message; in other words, states are likely
to believe their efforts to reassure other states to be more effective than they really are.
This bias can play an important role in causing spirals of hostility. When a state
thinks that its peaceful intentions are clear, it is hard for that state to believe that others
may be acting out of fear of it. The problem, then, is that because a state tends to
overestimate the clarity of its peace signals, it often mistakenly attributes inherent
hostility to other states when in fact those other states are acting out of fear of it. So, for
example, a limited conflict in North America between France and England escalated into
the Seven Years' War partly because each side assumed, wrongly, that the other side
knew that its aims were mostly benign.57
(B5) Overestimating others' centralization. According to psychological bias
theory, statesmen have a tendency to overestimate the degree to which the behavior of
other states is "centralized, planned and coordinated." 58 In other words, state leaders tend
to underestimate the extent to which other states' actions are caused by blunder, accident,
coincidence, confusion, and plain stupidity. They also tend to underestimate the inability
of other states' leaders to exert complete control over parts of their own government, i.e.
56 Ibid., 354-355.
57 Patrice Higonnet, "The Origins of the Seven Years' War", Journal of Modern Histoiy 40 (March 1968),
57-90. Discussed in Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 69.
58 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 319.
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the extent to which autonomy and insubordination on the part of other states' organs may
play a role in the behavior of those states.
Consequently, policymakers often misperceive other states' behavior as
indications of some coordinated plot or grand scheme when in fact that behavior resulted
from coincidence. "It is much less common for a decision-maker to see as coincidental a
set of events that are planned than for him to see as part of a plan actions that are in fact
coincidental." The same goes for confusion and stupidity within other states'
governments: "Because chaos and confusion are not intellectually and psychologically
satisfying explanations, actors must often seek hidden manipulations... [and] like
confusion, stupidity is rarely given its due. Instead, otherwise inexplicable behavior is
seen as part of a devious plot, usually a hostile one."59
Examples of such misperceptions abound. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, an
American U-2 reconnaissance plane got lost and mistakenly flew over Russia; President
Kennedy found it extremely difficult to convince Soviet leaders that the aircraft was
really lost and not sent to convey a threat. At the beginning of World War I, the German
battle cruiser Goeben escaped from much stronger British forces, largely through the
incompetence of the commanding admiral of Britain's Mediterranean fleet; German
leaders, however, were unable to believe that this episode was due to ineptitude and
instead saw it as indicating Britain's conciliatory stance toward Germany.60
This bias clearly has potential to be problematic, especially since it frequently
causes statesmen to perceive hostile intentions on the part of other states when in fact
those other states are behaving out of incompetence, lack of central governmental
59 Ibid., 321-323.
60 Ibid., 322-323.
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authority, or coincidence. In cases where an opponent state's actions are seemingly
contradictory - for example, where its ambassador negotiates cooperation while its
general makes bellicose statements - the state is apt to see this inconsistency as
indicating duplicity and insincerity rather than incompetence and confusion.
(B6) Tendency to overestimate the hostility of other states. A corollary of B4, B5,
and B6 is, as already indicated, that foreign-policymakers will tend to overestimate the
hostile intentions of other states.61 Because states often misunderstand their own role in
causing others' actions; because states underestimate how much they appear threatening
to others; because they overestimate the centralization of other governments; states have
a tendency to overestimate hostility in their opponents. The problem is compounded by
spiral effects: when State A overestimates the hostility of State B, it is likely to act in an
overly aggressive way towards the latter, which causes State B to overestimate the
hostility of State A, which leads to State B acting more aggressively than otherwise
toward State A, and so on.
It is important to note that Jervis is careful to say that states do not always
overestimate others' hostility. Sometimes, they may perceive correctly; in some other
cases, they may even underestimate the hostile intentions of an opponent (the standard
example of the latter is that of British and French perceptions of German intentions
throughout the 1930s). Jervis writes, "Both overestimates and underestimates of hostility
have led to war in the past." However, Jervis also argues that the chances of
overestimating an opponent's hostile intentions are greater than that of underestimating
61 I may be criticized here for confounding psychological bias with their effects. But, as Yaacov
Vertzberger observes, Jervis also confounds the two. Though Vertzberger's criticism that this causes
confusion is perhaps justified, my presentation here does have the merit of staying true to Jervis's own
account. See Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 17.
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it: "On balance, it seems that states are more likely to overestimate the hostility of others
than to underestimate it."6 2
(B7) Availability. According to cognitive psychology, people often make
judgments on the basis of how easily they can call to mind instances of the phenomenon
under consideration. 6 3 For example, if a college student is asked to estimate whether his
college has more students from California or Minnesota, he is likely to answer the
question by attempting to recall his schoolmates who come from California and
Minnesota. 64 Occasionally, this may be a sensible and effective strategy. But at other
times, it may lead to errors since the ease with which something can be recalled is a
function of other things besides just the frequency with which it appears in the world. For
example, psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman showed that when asked
whether the letter R appears more frequently in English as the first letter of a word or the
third letter, most people answer that R appears more frequently as the first letter, because
it is easier to think of words that begin with R than words that have R as the third letter; in
fact, there are more words that have R as the third letter.65
In international politics, this bias manifests itself most frequently in the tendency
for statesmen to use excessively their own frame of reference - and thus, neglect others'
perspectives - when analyzing the behavior and intentions of other states. As Jervis
writes, "What is highly available to a decision maker is his own plans and intentions. He
will see the behavior of others in light of what he is thinking of doing himself and will
62 Robert Jervis, "War and Misperception", Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18:4 (Spring, 1988), 675,
688.
63 See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction", Psychological Review 80
(1973) for the pioneering cognitive-psychology paper identifying this phenomenon.
64 Matlin, Cognition, 422.
65 Kahneman and Tversky, "On the Psychology of Prediction". Discussed in Sternberg, Cognitive
Psychology, 412.
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use his own procedures and approaches to interpret what they are doing."6 6 Before World
War II, for example, British military leaders estimated the size of the German air force by
assuming that "the best criteria for judging Germany's rate of expansion were those
which governed the rate at which the RAF [Royal Air Force] could itself form efficient
units." 6 7
Motivated Biases
Motivated biases, sometimes called 'affect-driven' biases, arise from
the emotions generated by conflicts that personal needs and severe situational dilemmas pose.
These biases serve important psychological functions, primarily minimizing the discomfort that
would be created by a full appreciation of the negative attributes of objects the person values, such
as his or her country or favored policy.68
In other words, statesmen often have a psychological need to perceive the world in
certain ways, which influences their interpretation of new information. It is
psychologically painful, for example, for a decisionmaker to realize that two of the
policies that he values counteract each other; this may cause him to neglect or discount
information that indicates the contradictory nature of those policies. Similarly, once a
decision maker has committed himself to a certain course of action, it may be costly -
both in terms of his psychological well-being and the resources that must be expended to
change course - to realize that that course of action is mistaken; this may influence him
to ignore or misinterpret information that demonstrates his error.
66 Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat", 23.
67 F.H. Hinsley, E.E. Thomas, C.F. Ransom, and R.C. Knight, British Intelligence in the Second World
War, 4 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1:299. Discussed in Jervis, "Perceiving and
Coping with Threat", op. cit.
68 Robert Jervis, "Introduction", in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology
and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 4.
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Clearly, this sort of bias can cause foreign-policymakers to misperceive and make
poor decisions. Three biases, in particular, are important:
(B8) Rationalizations ex post facto. As already mentioned, when leaders make a
certain decision or commit themselves to a particular course of action, it is
psychologically uncomfortable to realize that their decision was wrong. Hence, even after
they have made their decision, decision makers will seek information that justifies their
choice while unconsciously ignoring or discounting information that might indicate the
advantages of the road not taken. As Jervis writes, "The policy comes first, often for
reasons that are politically illegitimate or psychologically painful to recognize, and the
justification follows, reversing the normal order in which beliefs about other states
precede and lead to the foreign policy." 69
(B9) Avoid seeing value trade-offs. In formulating policies, state leaders are likely
to have multiple values that they wish to maximize: national security, economic
prosperity, social stability, international reputation, strength of alliances, and so on.
Psychologically, it is easier for leaders to believe that their preferred policy contributes to
satisfying all their cherished values rather than involving major trade-offs between those
values. Thus, policymakers tend to avoid - through unconscious ignoring or
misinterpretation of information - the realization that their chosen policy requires value
trade-offs. They may initially consider only one or two values in determining which
policy to adopt, and then, as they become aware that other important values are affected
by that policy, use flimsy arguments to convince themselves that those other values are
satisfied as well. At other times, they may pursue a set of values simultaneously and
simply fail to recognize that those goals may be inconsistent with one another. Thus, near
69 Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat", 25.
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the end of World War II, American policymakers found favorable both the idea of having
Soviet-friendly regimes in Eastern Europe and that of having free elections in the region,
failing to realize that those two policies were unlikely to be successfully pursued in
conjunction. 70
(B1 0) Overestimating the probability of success. As a corollary of B8, statesmen
often overestimate the chance that their chosen policy will succeed. After deciding on a
course of action, policymakers often seek out a great deal of information that would
justify their decision while unconsciously slighting, neglecting, or distorting information
that would impugn it. This causes them to become overconfident regarding that policy's
prospects. As Jervis writes, "When statesmen feel that alternatives are bleak, they are
likely to exaggerate the chances that the chosen policy will success. Furthermore, they
will not gather the information or perform the analyses that could indicate that this policy
is likely to fail."71
Prescriptions
As we have seen, psychological bias theory offers a host of explanations for why
decision makers often go wrong when they formulate policy. But from the perspective of
practical utility, it is more important for the theory to offer recommendations on how to
counteract the psychological barriers that lead to faulty decisionmaking. As Stephen Walt
argues, "Policy makers are often less interested in explaining a general tendency than in
figuring out how to overcome it."72 Stephen Van Evera likewise observes, "A good
theory has prescriptive richness. It yields useful policy recommendations." 73 Thus, since
70 George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 34.
71 Jervis, "Rational Deterrence", 197.
72 Walt, "Theory and Policy in IR", 37.
73 Van Evera, Guide to Methods, 21.
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our primary aim in this essay is to ask how useful psychological bias theory is to
policymakers, we must examine the prescriptions that the theory offers.
Jervis readily admits that psychological biases are entrenched in human thinking
and hence difficult to remove. Nevertheless, he clearly thinks that there are steps that
policymakers can take to offset those biases. "There are," Jervis writes, "ways to increase
the likelihood that the decision-maker will apply the full measure of his intelligence to
the tasks before him." 74 In other words, psychological bias theory is intended to be
prescriptively rich, in the sense of offering solutions for decisionmakers who wish to
improve their decisionmaking abilities.
For prescriptions to be useful, however, they must be at least reasonably specific,
and not just vague statements of principle. Jervis rightly asks of his own theory, "Can
anything then be said to scholars and decision-makers other than 'Avoid being either too
open or too closed, but be especially aware of the latter danger'?" 7 5 What are, then, the
specific solutions that psychological bias theory offers to policymakers?
(P1) Awareness of common misperceptions. The most obvious prescription is "for
decision-makers to take account of the ways in which the processes of perception lead to
common errors." In other words, by becoming familiar with psychological bias theory
and all the barriers to successful decisionmaking that the theory identifies, statesmen can
alter their decisionmaking practices and formulate better policies. For example, by being
aware that the interpretation of information is often influenced by preexisting beliefs,
policymakers may be motivated to search for discrepant information and to be more
careful about declaring the particular theory they hold to be confirmed. Awareness that
74 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 409.
75 Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception", World Politics 20:3 (Apr. 1968), 462.
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inappropriate historical analogies are often used because they are the most recent or most
dramatic may induce decisionmakers to call into question the applicability of particular
historical cases to the present situation.76
Besides awareness of processes that lead to misperceptions, Jervis also advocates
consciousness of common misperceptions themselves. He writes, "Decision-
makers...should also note the distortions that commonly result - e.g. the belief that the
other side is highly centralized and carefully plans its moves, the belief that favorable
actions by the other are a response to the actor's behavior but that unfriendly acts spring
from unprovoked hostility."77 If decisionmakers are aware that such perceptions are often
misperceptions, they are likely to be more cautious about affirming them in any particular
case.
Awareness of misperceptions and processes that lead to misperceptions is
probably the most important prescription offered by psychological bias theory. Besides
Jervis, many theorists who study psychological bias emphasis the importance of such
awareness. According to Yaacov Vertzberger, "The most elementary and obvious
measure [to improve decision making] is learning to be aware of and recognize the main
pitfalls of information processing. To be aware is to be warned." 7 8 Business professors
John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, and Howard Raiffa similarly write, "The best protection
against all psychological traps...is awareness. Forewarned is forearmed."7 9 Decision
scientists Edward Russo and Paul Schoemaker emphasize, "By understanding how good
76 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 423.
77 Ibid., 424.
78 Vertzberger, World in their Minds, 357.
79 John Hammond, Ralph Keeney, and Howard Raiffa, "The Hidden Traps in Decision Making", in
Harvard Business Review on Decision Making (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001), 167.
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thinking succeeds and how errors are made, we can better manage both the vast quantity
of information that... besieges us."80
(Of course, this is hardly surprising: almost any theory that offers policy
implications will count, implicitly or explicitly, awareness of its content as a prime
prescription; and most likely, the other prescriptions will presuppose such awareness.)
(P2) Devils' advocates. One of the major problems that derive from psychological
biases is that decision makers are frequently overconfident in their views. All too often,
statesmen are so convinced of the truth of their beliefs that they do not stop to examine
other theories which later prove to be superior. An example of this overconfidence is
American leaders' confidence prior to Pearl Harbor that there would not be a surprise
Japanese attack - a confidence that had much to do with psychological biases. When
informed of the Japanese assault, the US secretary of the navy responded, "My God, this
can't be true. This [message] must mean the Philippines" - not, as Jervis points out, that
the report was not true, but that it could not be true.81 (In fact, overconfidence in one's
beliefs is so pervasive that it is frequently listed as a bias in its own right by cognitive
psychologists and other decisionmaking theorists.8 2) In other words, the wages of
psychological bias is that people often suffer from "premature cognitive closure"8 3
they become certain of the truth of one particular theory long before they have sufficient
reason to do so.
80 J. Edward Russo and Paul Schoemaker, Decision Traps. Ten Barriers to Decision-Making and How to
Overcome Them (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 226.
81 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 145.
82 see Sternberg, Cognitive Psychology, 415; Baruch Fischhoff, "Debiasing", in eds. Daniel Kahneman,
Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 431-440; Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "On the Reality of
Cognitive Illusions, Psychological Review 103:3 (1996), 587-589; Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa,
"Hidden Traps in Decision Making", 162-163; Max Bazerman, Judgment in Managerial Decision Making,
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Ideally, decision makers should formulate and consider alternative theories that
may be true. However, it is usually difficult for an individual to do this by himself, for
two reasons. First, it is psychologically difficult: as already shown, the upshot of the
various psychological biases is that'individuals often find it difficult to examine
alternative images. Second, it may be politically difficult: leaders are usually chosen and
valued for an ability to be decisive and bold rather than to carefully analyze issues from
multiple angles.
One important solution is for leaders to include in their advisory staff analysts who
are likely, for various reasons, to hold competing perspectives. By doing so,
policymakers increase their capacity to consider multiple theories and hence their ability
to avoid premature cognitive closure. As Jervis writes, "To make it more likely that
[policymakers] will consider alternative explanations of specific bits of data and think
more carefully about beliefs and images that underlie their policies, they should employ
devil's - or rather devils' - advocates."84
The employment of devils' advocates is related to solution P3, discussed below,
which is to make explicit one's assumptions and reasoning. By being exposed to
competing theories and explanations, a policymaker will compel himself to make a
conscious decision about which theory to hold, rather than unconsciously assuming that
his particular theory is necessarily correct. Also, implicit assumptions are often brought
out during debates between individuals who hold competing theories, because
"interaction with someone who holds a different position usually is the best, if not the
only, way... [for a policymaker] to see where his arguments are most vulnerable." 85
84 Ibid., 416.
85 Ibid., 416.
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(P3) Making theories and beliefs explicit. A third prescription that psychological
bias theory gives is for decisionmakers to make their beliefs and theories more explicit.
There is a need to do this because people often make decisions without being conscious
of what theories underlie those decisions, and without knowing what assumptions in turn
underlie those theories; such unconsciousness increases the risk that a policymaker will
make decisions based on inadequate theories or hidden, erroneous assumptions. As Jervis
writes, "People often not only have a limited understanding of the workings of others'
arguments, they also do not know the structure of their own belief systems - what
values are most important, how some beliefs are derived from others, and what evidence
would contradict their views." 86
Making explicit the theory or belief on the basis of which one is acting yields
several related benefits for decisionmaking. First, as already hinted at, it forces one to
confront the theory and the assumptions on which one is acting, thus helping to prevent
incorrect theories and assumptions from being translated into decisions. Second, it allows
one to become cognizant of the predictions that are made by one's theory, thus enhancing
one's ability to modify or discard flawed theories (i.e. when its predictions do not obtain).
Decisionmakers should, in other words, "consider what evidence would tend to confirm,
or, more importantly, disconfirm, their views."87 Third, making explicit one's reasoning
increases one's adaptivity to changing circumstances because it forces one to distinguish
between subgoals (i.e. means) and primary goals (i.e. ends), thus enhancing one's ability
to abandon certain subgoals when those subgoals are no longer appropriate for the
86 Ibid., 410.
87 Ibid., 413.
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attainment of one's primary goals. (See prescription P4 below for an explanation of why
subgoals can unconsciously and problematically become ends in themselves.)
Besides Jervis, decision theorists Irving Janis and Leon Mann have made this
prescription one of the cornerstones of their program to train individuals to make better
decisions. They advocate an "awareness of rationalizations" procedure that uses various
methods, such as role-playing and Socratic questioning, to compel individuals to confront
the deficient reasoning that often underlies their decisions.88
(P4) Not allowing one 's identity to become attached to specific beliefs. As
discussed earlier, decisionmakers' perceptions are often skewed when they have
psychological needs to see the world in certain ways. One major way in which this sort of
need may arise is when people and organizations unwittingly allow specific theories,
beliefs, and subgoals to become part of their identities. This can cause significant
problems for decisionmakers: when one's identity is tied to a specific theory, it becomes
hard to see when those theories are incorrect or no longer valid. Similarly, when one's
identify is bound up with specific subgoals, it is difficult to appreciate when those
subgoals are no longer the most appropriate means of reaching one's primary aims. For
example, in the years leading up to World War II, the US Air Force's identity became
tied to the virtues of strategic bombardment, leading to an overemphasis on bomber
technology and an unfortunate neglect of fighter development; this neglect proved highly
problematic in the first months of the US's entry into the war - bombers flying without
fighter escorts proved too vulnerable to conduct effective bombing missions - but was
still not corrected until 18 months into the American war effort.89
88 Janis and Mann, Decision Making, 340-365.
89 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 421-422.
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Therefore, leaders should take care that their and their organizations' identities do
not become bound to specific beliefs, and that means do not become ends in themselves
which detract from the principal mission at hand. For foreign-policymakers, it is
particularly important not to allow images of other states to become bound up with their
identities.
Psychological bias theory, as we have seen, offers a variety of prescriptions. But
how useful are those prescriptions to policymakers? Can they actually help statesmen to
make better decisions in foreign policy? To examine this question, I propose the strategy
of looking at two historical cases that are usually seen as having involved significant
misperceptions. The first case is that of the US decision to cross the 38th parallel during
the Korean war, while the second concerns the British policy of appeasement toward
Nazi Germany. In each case, I shall ask whether psychological bias theory could have
made a positive difference in the outcome. The chief advantage of the strategy pursued
here is that it offers a concrete demonstration of the extent to which the theory is useful;
the assumption is that policymakers are more likely to be convinced of a theory's
practical utility if they see how it could be (or could have been) applied to actual cases, as
opposed to hearing only abstract statements of the theory's usefulness.
Case 1: US decision to cross the 3 8th parallel. 1950
Background9 0
90 For additional background, see Burton Kaufman, The Korean Conflict (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1999); Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985); David Rees, Korea.' The
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In late September 1950, US President Truman and his staff faced a difficult
decision. Three months previously, in late June, the communist regime in North Korea
had invaded South Korea, a US ally. Truman had sent US forces to repel the North
Korean attack. Though initially suffering severe setbacks, the combined South Korean
and US troops were eventually able to stem the North Korean advance. By late
September, the North Korean forces had been driven back over the 38th parallel, the line
that marked the border between North and South Korea.
At this point, the original objective of the US mission - to repel the North
Korean invasion and restore the status quo - had been achieved. American leaders now
had two options: one, to stop the American forces at the 38 th parallel, or two, to continue
to push north past the parallel, defeat the remnants of the North Korean army, and reunify
Korea.91 A key factor in this decision was the possibility of Chinese and Soviet
intervention: by pushing north with the intention of conquering North Korea, there was a
real chance of provoking China or the Soviet Union into military involvement.
The US leadership eventually decided to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea.
South Korean troops crossed the parallel on October 1, followed shortly by US troops on
October 7. The US and South Korean forces advanced into North Korea with a rapidity
that surprised even American military leaders. The North Korean army suffered
numerous defeats and retreated in disarray. Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, fell on
October 19. On October 24, General Douglas MacArthur, the US commander, ordered
his forces to advance to the Yalu River, which marked the boundary between China and
North Korea.
91 The country had been divided into USSR- and US-controlled halves after World War II, and agreed all-
Korea elections were never held because of deteriorating relations between the two superpowers. Instead,
two separate client states were established.
39
But the American success was short-lived. On October 26, US forces in North
Korea began encountering - to their surprise - resistance from Chinese troops. After
about two weeks of fighting, the Chinese forces mysteriously broke off contact and
withdrew. MacArthur continued to march on north to the Yalu, announcing an 'end-the-
war' offensive on November 24. Two days later, however, the Chinese forces attacked in
massive numbers, wreaking havoc on the over-extended and ill-prepared US/South
Korean troops. Unable to halt the Chinese attack, the US forces were forced into a hasty
and chaotic retreat, suffering "one of the worst defeats an American army has ever
suffered".9 2 By the time the Chinese advance was finally stalled, US forces had been
pushed back over the 38th parallel - and were once again trying to prevent the conquest
of South Korea.
The majority of historians view the US decision to cross the 3 8th parallel as
disastrous. Most scholars agree that the Chinese entry into the war could have been
averted if the US had refrained from crossing the parallel.9 3 In the ensuing conflict, which
lasted for two and a half years, little was gained. Most of the war consisted of a bloody
stalemate around the vicinity of the parallel. By the time the war ended, the border
between North and South Korea was little changed from the status quo antebellum. The
cost, however, was considerable: in addition to the vast number of lives lost9 4, the war
92 Roy Appleman, Disaster in Korea. The Chinese Confiont MacArthur (College Station: Texas A&M
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greatly exacerbated the incipient hostility between the two great powers, and also
prevented the US from taking early strategic advantage of the growing rift between China
and the Soviet Union.95
The decision was also somewhat puzzling. First, Korea was acknowledged by US
leaders to be of low strategic value. As the Cold War was starting to take shape,
American energies were largely concentrated on Europe. The US did not want to
overextend its finite military resources into other areas, such as Asia, lest this
compromised the ability of the US to counter the Soviet threat in Europe. Even within
Asia, Korea was considered to be an area of marginal strategic interest.96 Second, there
were also numerous indications, both before and after the American intervention in June
1950, of US reluctance to enter into military conflict with the Chinese Communist
regime, especially a full-scale war like the one that eventually erupted.9 7 Third, and
perhaps most significantly, the Chinese regime had sent several messages to the US in
early October 1950 warning that Chinese military intervention would ensue if American
forces crossed the parallel.
wounded; estimates of Chinese deaths range from 150,000 to 500,000; while over 4 millions Koreans are
estimated to have been killed, injured, or rendered missing.
95 Walter Lafeber, "Crossing the 38th: the Cold War in Microcosm", in eds. Lynn H. Miller and Ronald W.
Pruessen, Reflections on the Cold War (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1974); Stueck, Road to Confrontation,
253.
96 In an infamous speech given in January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson spoke of an American
"defensive perimeter" in East Asia, which noticeably excluded Korea. In June 1949, the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff concluded that "Korea is of little strategic value to the United States and that any commitment to
United States use of military force in Korea would be ill-advised and impracticable in view of.. .our heavy
international obligations as compared with our current military strength." See "Crisis in Asia - An
Examination of U.S. Policy", remarks by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, National Press Club,
Washington, 12 January 1950, in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXII, no. 551 (23 January 1950), 111-
118; and JCS 1776/4, 23 June 1949, quoted in James Schnabel, Policy and Direction: the First Year
(Washington: United States Army Office of the Chief of Military History, 1972), 50.
97 David McClellan, for example, notes the "prudent policy which the [Truman] administration
had... adopted with regard to Red China" in the period before the Korean War. See David McClellan,
"Dean Acheson and the Korean War", Political Science Quarterly 83:1 (March 1968), 16.
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The clearest and most important of these messages was sent through K.M.
Panikkar, India's ambassador to China, on 3 October 1950. Zhou Enlai, the Chinese
premier, stated unequivocally to Pannikar that "American intrusion into North Korea
would encounter Chinese resistance."98 This message was received by Washington
through the American embassy in New Delhi, as well as the embassies in Moscow,
Stockholm, and London. (The US and China, having no diplomatic ties at this time, had
no direct means of communication.) A little more than a week earlier, Panikkar had been
told something similar by the chief of staff of the Chinese army, who declared that the
Chinese would not "sit back with folded hands and let the Americans come up to the
border."9 9 Moreover, in an official speech in September 1950, Zhou had voiced a fairly
unambiguous warning to the US not to cross the parallel. '0 0
Why, then, despite the low strategic value accorded to Korea; the apparent US
reluctance to start a war with China; and the Chinese warnings that if US forces crossed
the line, war would ensure, did US leaders take the decision to cross the 38th parallel in
October 1950, triggering a war that "neither side wanted and both tried to avoid"?'0 '
Explanation
Psychological bias theory seems to be able to provide at least a partial explanation
for the US decision. The historical consensus is that the US decision was primarily
98 Quoted in Priscilla Roberts, "Sardar K.M. Panikkar", in ed. Spencer Tucker, Encyclopedia of the Korean
War. A Political, Social, and Military History (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2000).
99 Nieh Jung-chen, quoted in Foot, Wrong War, 79.
'00 In this speech before the Central People's Government Council, Zhou stated, "The Chinese people
enthusiastically love peace, but in order to defend peace, they never have been and never will be afraid to
oppose aggressive war. The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate foreign aggression, nor will they
supinely tolerate seeing their neighbors being savagely invade by the imperialists." Quoted in Alan
Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 108.
10' Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 184.
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caused by misperceptions in three areas.1 0 2 First, Truman and his staff misperceived the
capabilities of China, consistently underestimating the extent to which China could
successfully fight a major land war against the US. Second, American leaders
misperceived the Chinese image of the US. They believed that China knew that the US
had no aggressive intentions in Asia; in reality, however, China viewed the US largely as
a belligerent, expansionist power. Third, the US misperceived Chinese intentions: it
wrongly thought that Chinese would not intervene if the US sent its troops over the 38th
parallel. (Of course, these three areas are interrelated: misperceptions of capabilities and
the Chinese image of the US had much to do with why Chinese intentions were
misperceived.)
The biases identified by psychological bias theory appear capable of explaining
much of the US misperception. One of the main reasons that the US misestimated
Chinese intentions is that it failed to realize that by advancing up into North Korea and
toward the Yalu river, it would threaten China's sense of national security. The puzzle, as
David McClellan aptly puts it, is that "the United States had not hesitated to resist
aggression eight thousand miles from its shores; why should China not be expected to
react to MacArthur's hostile campaign in similar fashion?"'0 3
This failure can partly be explained by psychological bias B4, i.e. the tendency to
underestimate the extent to which the other side feels threatened by you. The US by and
large saw itself as a pacific nation that had been compelled to fight in Korea for defensive
purposes. It also regarded itself as having no aggressive intentions in Asia and, in
102 This consensus is noted, e.g., by Thomas Christensen, who writes of these "standard interpretations of
the Chinese failure to deter the United States in October". See Thomas Christensen, "Threats, Assurances,
and the Last Chance for Peace: The Lessons of Mao's Korean War Telegrams", International Security 17:1
(Summer 1992), 129.
103 McClellan, "Dean Acheson", 36.
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particular, no desire to attack the Chinese mainland. The problem was that US leaders
overestimated the extent to which these peaceful intentions would be clear to their
Chinese opponents. This explains, for example, why US attempts to reassure China in the
summer and fall of 1950 placed much more emphasis on declaring that they would not
attack China's power stations on the Yalu river instead of promising that there would be
no invasion of Chinese territory: Truman and his advisors did not realize that China
actually feared a direct attack - largely because they believed that they had already
made it obvious that there would be no such attack.' 04 Because of B4, states usually
overestimate the efficacy of their reassurance efforts. This helps to explain why Truman
and his staff, underestimating the depth of Chinese suspicion, thought that their public
statements would suffice to remove any doubt about the peacefulness of US intentions° 5,
and that the Chinese threats of intervention must therefore be bluffs; there was no way,
they thought, that China could still felt threatened after the numerous declarations of
goodwill.' 06
Psychological bias B7, the tendency to focus excessively on one 's own frame of
reference, also helps explain why the US did not realize that its advance into North Korea
threatened China's security. US analysis of the conflict concentrated entirely on the US
view of the conflict, which was that of an operation to defend her ally, South Korea,
against naked aggression by the North. The US was unable to grasp the extent to which
China felt threatened because it failed to give sufficient consideration to the possibility
104 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 46.
105 e.g. Acheson's public statement on 30 August 1950 that the US did not have any aggressive intent
towards China or anywhere else, and Truman's public statement on 1 September 1950 that expressed his
administration's hope that "the people of China will not be misled or forced into fighting against the United
Nations and against the American people who have always been and still are their friends." See Walter H.
Waggoner, "Acheson Says U.S. is Trying to Keep Peiping Out of War", New York Times, 30 August 1950;
and Truman, Memoirs, 359.
106 McClellan, "Dean Acheson", 20.
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that the other side was operating from a completely different frame of reference, i.e. one
in which the US was a hostile power which would be able to threaten China if it gained a
foothold in continental Asia. As Alexander George and Richard Smoke write, "U.S.
leaders miscalculated because they failed to understand the frame of reference from
which the Chinese Communist leaders assessed the significance of what the United States
was doing in Korea." As a result, "U.S. leaders grossly underestimated the strength of
Peking's motivation to intervene." 107
Motivated biases also contribute to the explanation. Once the US had decided on
its policy of sending forces to reunify the two Koreas, it became much less sensitive to
information that would impugn the wisdom of that policy. As George and Smoke argue,
"Washington's reluctance to accept information that challenged the premises and wisdom
of its policy strongly encouraged its tendencies to misread the frame of reference with
which Peking perceived events in Korea, to misinterpret available intelligence, and to
underestimate Peking's motivation and willingness to take risks."'0 8
In short, psychological bias theory seems to be able to (at least partially) explain
the US decision to cross the 38 th parallel. However, as noted earlier in this essay, from a
practical perspective, a theory's explanations are less important than its prescriptions; it
is more useful for a policymaker to know what he should do than to know why he acts as
he does.09 Therefore, in order to really use the Korean War case to analyze the utility of
psychological bias theory, we need to ask ourselves what difference the theory's
prescriptions would have made in the case. In other words, if US leaders in 1950 had
been adherents of psychological bias theory, would they have made a better decision?
107 George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 213.
'O Ibid., 191-192.
109 Zelikow, Foreign Policy Engineering ,151-155.
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Prescription
At first glance, it seems that the prescriptions of psychological bias theory could
have done much to prevent - or at least lower the likelihood of - the ruinous US
decision to cross the parallel.
If US leaders had made explicit the beliefs and reasoning that underlay their
decision - i.e. adopted prescription P3 - they might have been able to correct the
erroneous perceptions that contributed to their decision. For example, one line of
reasoning used by the American leadership was that if China (or the Soviet Union)
wanted to intervene in the conflict, it would have done so in July and August 1950, when
US/South Korean forces were cornered in a small area around the southeastern port of
Pusan and North Korean victory appeared imminent; since Chinese intervention had not
taken place by September, it was probably not going to happen at all. As David Rees
writes, "It was thought that as the Chinese had not intervened in August when merely a
couple of extra divisions could have pushed the [US] Eight Army into the sea, why
should they attempt military intervention in October." 10 The implicit assumption was
that China's prime objective in any intervention would be the protection of North Korea's
territorial integrity. If US leaders had made this assumption explicit, they may have
questioned its legitimacy and perhaps realized - or at least considered the possibility -
that China was also worried about her own national security, and hence that the absence
of intervention in August 1950 did not entail the low probability of such intervention in
October.
Prescription P3 could also have helped in another way. Truman's orders up to
mid-September 1950 had been based around the policy that if Soviet or Chinese troops
10 Rees, Limited War, 111.
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entered North Korea, the US would refrain from crossing the 3 8 th parallel. "' The
problem was that Truman and his staff incorrectly assumed that Soviet and Chinese
leaders were aware of the American policy. 12 This meant that when no Chinese and
Soviet troops entered Korea after the Inchon landing of September 15 3, the Truman
administration inferred, erroneously, that the Communist powers did not intend to
become directly involved in the conflict. If Truman and his advisors had made their
reasoning more explicit, they may have questioned their assumption and realized that
their policy was not obvious to China and the Soviet Union, and so that the Communist
powers' lack of intervention immediately after the Inchon landing did not mean that they
were not going to intervene at all.
Awareness of common misperceptions - prescription P1 - also appears as it if
might have helped. One common misperception posited by psychological bias theory is
the (mistaken) belief that the other side understands that you are not a threat. As
discussed earlier, the US was quite certain that it had no intention of attacking Chinese
territory and mistakenly believed that China knew this as well. If US leaders had been
aware of this common misperception, they may have been more sensitive to the fact that
the Chinese side did not share the US's benign self-image. In turn, if US leaders had
rectified this misperception, they may have taken the Chinese threats more seriously,
1 1 For example, NSC-8 1, the National Security Council report that Truman authorized on September 11
and sent to MacArthur on September 15 clearly stated: "The United Nations Commander should undertake
no ground operations north of the 38th parallel in the event of the occupation of North Korea by Soviet or
Chinese Communist forces." See "NSC-81: US Courses of Action with Respect to Korea" in ed. Spencer
Tucker, Encyclopedia of the Korean War: A Political, Social, and Military History (Santa Barbara: ABC-
Clio, 2000), 888-892.
112 Stueck, Road to Confrontation, 228-229.
113 The amphibious US assault on Inchon, a port situated on the west coast of Korea, marked the turning
point of the war. Previous to that, US/South Korean forces were trapped in an 80-mile perimeter around the
southeastern port of Pusan. After the successful landing at Inchon, US forces were able to attack the North
Korean army on two fronts and turn the tide of the conflict.
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instead of as mere bluffs, and also done more to reassure the Chinese side of its peaceful
intentions.
Awareness ofprocesses that commonly lead to misperception (prescription P1)
could have proved helpful to US policymakers. One important process that, according to
psychological bias theory, frequently causes misperception is the tendency to neglect the
other side's frame of reference. In this case, US policymakers failed to consider that the
Chinese frame of reference may not have classified the US as a peaceful, non-aggressive
power. If US leaders had been aware of the tendency to neglect the other's frame of
reference, they may have made efforts to counter it. For example, they could have
dedicated analytical energies to investigating factors that were relevant from the other
side's perspective - much as Marshall Schulman, assistant to Secretary of State Cyrus
Vance, did during the SALT II negotiations, when he maintained a chart showing all the
events and factors that were likely to be of relevance to the Soviet frame of reference.1 4
They might also have employed what Alexander George and Richard Smoke call the
"method of analytic predictions", which is to examine actions that the other side might
take and which appear improbable prima facie, and earnestly attempt to construct
hypothetical scenarios or circumstances under which those seemingly unlikely actions
would be taken; in this way, policymakers might discover that certain actions are much
less implausible than previously thought." 15
The use of devils' advocates (prescription P2) also might have helped. George
and Smoke report that the record of the Korean crisis shows no indication that any US
114 See Strobe Talbott, Endgame: The Inside Story ofSALTII (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), 80, 120,
146. Discussed in Robert Jervis, "The Drunkard's Search", in eds. Shanto Iyengar and William McGuire,
Explorations in Political Psychology, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 346.
115 See George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 480-481. George and Smoke also call
it the "method of conditional prediction".
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official was given the task of vigorously playing devils' advocate in order to test the
assumptions and theories on the basis of which the decision to cross the parallel was
made. 11 6 (George Kennan, who had recently left his position as director of the State
Department's Policy Planning Staff, did voice his opposition to the decision, but his
opinion was neither heeded nor incorporated into any systematic effort to test
assumptions.) If Truman had consciously instituted a system of devils' advocacy, those
erroneous assumptions and theories may have been challenged and found lacking.
Difficulties
Despite the apparent usefulness of psychological bias theory's prescriptions,
however, there are also elements of the Korean War case that point to significant
difficulties in the straightforward application of these prescriptions.
The main thrust of our account so far is that US leaders significantly misperceived
Chinese intentions during the Korean War; that those misperceptions had much to do
with psychological biases; and that the prescriptions of psychological bias theory could,
through reducing psychological bias, have helped US leaders to more accurately perceive
Chinese intentions.
But it must also be emphasized that there was a great deal of ambiguity about the
situation, and in particular, about Chinese intentions. Historical accounts have usually
focused on criticizing Truman and his advisors for failing to grasp the numerous signs of
Chinese intentions, and underplayed the extent to which the Chinese gave off mixed
signals. But, as Thomas Christensen writes, "even the most critical scholars understand
the difficulties the Truman administration faced in reading Chinese signals of resolve in
116 Ibid., 216.
49
early October." 17 In other words, the signs that might have indicated Chinese intentions
were more ambiguous than historical accounts usually emphasize. It is illuminating to
note that even Panikkar, who was the Indian ambassador to China, reckoned on 20
September 1950 - mere weeks before Chinese troops started entering North Korea -
that direct Chinese participation was unlikely. 118
It is at least arguable, then, that the signals given off by China could have been
interpreted in a number of ways and were consistent with several competing theories of
Chinese intention. In particular, there was the possibility that China was attempting to
engage in deception, i.e. that the Chinese threat were bluffs intended to convince the US
of her resolve. States, after all, often have an incentive to represent their willingness to
fight as greater than it actually is, i.e. for compellence or deterrence purposes. Therefore,
even though the theory adopted by the US - i.e. that China had no intention of
intervening - was ultimately shown to be wrong, it can be argued that this theory was
consistent with the limited amount of information available to the US at the time.
The problem of ambiguous signals is compounded by that of changing
intentions. During a crisis, intentions can change rapidly. During the Korean crisis, the
evidence shows that the Chinese leadership was uncertain about intervening and changed
its mind numerous times (largely in response to changing Soviet promises of support).
There was, in fact, intense debate within the Chinese leadership on whether to intervene
even after Zhou Enlai's warning to K.M. Panikkar on 3 October 1950.1l 9 Chairman Mao
eventually made the decision to intervene - but not without much wavering and
hesitation. (This vacillation afflicted both sides: Michael Hunt comments that "had Mao
117 Christensen, "Threats, Assurances, and the Last Chance for Peace", 132
118 Stueck, Road to Confrontation, 229
119 Foot, "Making Known the Unknown War", 417.
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and Truman been clairvoyant...both would have been shocked by the muddle their
opposite number was in."120) Because Chinese intentions changed so rapidly, it would
likely have been difficult for US leaders to correctly perceive those intentions even if
psychological biases had been removed.
A third problem is that the Chinese side greatly overestimated its own
capabilities. Chinese military capabilities were not as weak as the US perceived, but were
also not as strong as the Chinese themselves believed. The Chinese forces in Korea not
only lacked air power, but also had serious shortages of armor, artillery, transport,
communications, firearms, food supplies, and logistics. Mao thought that the supposedly
high morale of the Chinese army would more than compensate for their lack of
equipment. The Chinese troops, however, soon found that hard resources mattered more
than their leaders had expected. 121 One could say, therefore, that China suffered
misperceptions of itself This means that even if the US had no misperceptions
whatsoever about Chinese capabilities, and then rationally formed a picture of Chinese
intentions based on those capabilities, it may still have made a sub-optimal decision
simply because of mistaken Chinese self-perceptions.
These considerations show that there is no guarantee that prescriptions aimed at
correcting psychological processes that lead to misperceptions will actually lead to better
decisions being made. Also, because intentions are so difficult to ascertain, awareness of
common misperceptions is not as useful as we might think: even if one knows that certain
misperceptions are common, one cannot really judge whether that misperception is
present in a particular case unless one has a reasonably good idea of the intentions of
120 Michael Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950-July 1951", Political Science Quarterly 107:3
(August 1992), 475.
121 Sandler, Korean War, 115.
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one's opponent. I shall say more about these difficulties later on. Before doing that,
however, I turn to examine our second case: the British policy of appeasement towards
Germany in the 1930s.
Case 2: British policy of appeasement towards Germany, 1 939122
Background
Historians generally agree that British policy towards Germany in the 1930s was
founded on serious misperceptions about German intention. 23 Early commentators were
nearly unanimous in excoriating British leaders of the 1930s - especially Neville
Chamberlain, prime minister from 1937 to 1940 - for foolishly pursuing a policy of
appeasement and conciliation toward Nazi Germany when they should have taken a
tough stance towards the German regime. The usual charge was that British leaders, who
were desperate to avoid war, had tragically misperceived German intentions, erroneously
believing that Hitler had only limited aims in Europe and that once those aims were
satisfied, Germany would be content and not cause any more trouble. In particular,
British statesmen thought that Hitler only wanted to unite all German-speaking people in
a single state and to revise the more unjust terms of the Versailles peace settlement. In
reality, as we now know, Nazi Germany had wide-ranging, expansionist aims that
included the conquest of Eastern Europe and the extermination of the Jewish people.
122 For simplicity's sake, I focus mostly on Britain as the perceiving subject and only mention France in
passing. Though French perceptions were, of course, significant in the matter, it is probably fair to say that
the French position in this period largely followed the lead of Britain. As R.J. Overy writes, "It was British
strategy that tended to prevail." See R.J. Overy, The Origins of the Second World War, 2nd ed. (London:
Longman, 1998), 17
123 For the historiography of appeasement, see Robert Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered",
International Security 14:2 (Autumn 1989); and J.L. Richardson, "New Perspectives on Appeasement:
Some Implications for International Relations", World Politics 40:3, (Apr. 1988).
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British leaders' catastrophic misperception of German intentions caused them to
acquiesce on numerous occasions when Germany challenged the status quo and
abrogated the Versailles peace agreement. In 1935, Germany began to openly rearm,
which had been forbidden by the Versailles treaty; Britain and France protested, but did
nothing about it. (In fact, Britain even signed a naval agreement with Germany in the
same year.) In 1936, Hitler sent German troops into the Rhineland, an area of Germany
that was required by Versailles to be demilitarized. There was talk of intervention, but
again, Britain and France did nothing. In 1938, Germany annexed Austria, again in
violation of Versailles.
Most disgraceful, however, was the German takeover of the Sudetenland in
September 1938. The Sudetenland was an area of Czechoslovakia in which the majority
of the population was ethnically German. Hitler demanded that this territory be ceded to
Germany, threatening war if Czechoslovakia did not comply. Despite earlier French
security guarantees to Czechoslovakia, Britain, France, and Germany came to an
agreement at Munich that Germany would be allowed to annex the Sudetenland, in
exchange for vague promises of future good behavior. This effectively left
Czechoslovakia defenseless against Germany because the Sudeten territory contained
most of the Czechoslovak fortifications and armament industries. British leaders sighed
with relief and believed that Hitler had been finally satiated and that peace had at least
achieved. Famously, Chamberlain declared publicly on his return from the Munich
conference, "I believe it is peace for our time."' 24
124 Cited by Telford Taylor, Munich. The Price of Peace (Garden City: Doubleday, 1979), 65; and Beck,
"Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", 170.
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British confidence in the wisdom of appeasement was brutally shattered in March
1939 when Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia; half of the country (Bohemia
and Moravia) was turned into an official German protectorate, while the other half
(Slovakia) became de jure independent but de facto a satellite state of Germany. As R.R.
Palmer et al. write, "A horrible realization now spread in France and Britain. It was clear
that Hitler's most solemn guarantees were worthless, that his designs were not limited to
Germans, but reached out to all eastern Europe, and beyond, that he was essentially
insatiable, that he could not be appeased." 1 25 Six months later, Germany invaded Poland.
Britain and France finally resisted - something which they should have done years ago.
The Second World War in Europe had begun.
Such is the essence of the highly critical account espoused by almost all
commentators until the 1960s. 12 6 These authors generally concurred in the idea that war
could have been prevented if Britain and France had only stood firm in the 1930s (though
they disagreed on which crisis represented the last chance for peace). This view is best
summed up by Winston Churchill, who wrote in 1948, "There never was a war more easy
to stop than that which has just wrecked what was left of the world from the previous
struggle."'27 Lewis Namier similarly argues, "At several junctures [Germany's bid for
world domination] could have been stopped without excessive effort or sacrifice, but was
125 R.R. Palmer, Joel Colton, and Lloyd Kramer, A History of the Modern World, 9t ed. (New York: Alfred
Knopf, 2002), 809.
126 Such critics included Lewis Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939 (London: Macmillan, 1948); A.L.
Rowse, Appeasement. A Study in Political Decline, 1933-1939 (New York: Norton, 1961); Alan Bullock,
Hitler. A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper & Row, 1952); Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Rome-Berlin
Axis. A History of the Relations Between Hitler and Mussolini (London: Oxford University Press, 1949);
John Wheeler-Bennett, Munich: Prologue to Tragedy (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1948). See
Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", 164, for an extensive list.
127 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Book One: The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin, 1948), i.
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not."12 8 Many proponents of this view asserted that a tough stance by the western powers
would have cowed Hitler and deterred him from his quest of conquering Eastern Europe.
Such scholars point, for example, to Hitler's comment, made some time after the
Rhineland reoccupation. that if French forces had been sent to oppose the move,
Germany would have had to retreat with its tail between its legs.129 Some critics went
further, arguing that British and French resistance to Hitler could have caused the dictator
to be removed from power in a coup: the German military leadership was initially
skeptical of Hitler's risky foreign policy and might have overthrown him had his gambles
failed. Critics also argued that if Britain and France had been vigilant about restraining
German rearmament, Hitler would not have acquired the military potency which
eventually allowed him, by the end of the 1930s, to confidently make his bid for the
subjugation of Eastern Europe.
From the 1960s onwards, some - though by no means all - historians began
arguing for a more sympathetic portrait of Chamberlain and the policy of appeasement.1 30
Many of these revisionists argue that other factors besides a mistaken image of Hitler
contributed to British leaders' adopting the policy of appeasement: national interests, a
recognition of Germany's grievances, public opinion, military weakness, and so on. They
also contend that Chamberlain's misconception of Hitler was not as severe as the early
128 Namier, Diplomatic Prelude, ix. Discussed in P.M.H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in
Europe, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1997), 47.
129 Cited by Bell, Origins of the Second World War, 234. Note that Bell finds it dubious whether Germany
would have retreated as easily as Hitler claims.
130 Early challengers to the traditional view include A.J.P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961); and Donald Watt, "Appeasement: The Rise of the Revisionist
School?", Political Quarterly 36:2 (Apr.-Jun. 1965). Others include Paul Schroeder, "Munich and the
British Tradition", The Historical Journal 19:1 (1976); Keith Eubank, Munich (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1963); Robbins, Munich 1938 [fn. 50 above]; Iain Macleod, Neville Chamberlain (New
York: Atheneum, 1961); Corelli Barnett, The Collapse of British Power (New York: Morrow, 1972); Paul
Kennedy, "Appeasement", History Today 32 (Oct. 1982). For a comprehensive listing, see Beck,
"Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", 163-168.
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critics alleged: records show that Chamberlain was privately much more doubtful about
Hitler than his public statements indicated.131 Some scholars also contend that Hitler was
prepared to go to war no matter what and was hence undeterrable; appeasement,
therefore, affected the timing but not the eventuality of World War II.
So there is a considerable degree of historical controversy over the extent to
which British leaders, especially Neville Chamberlain, should be criticized for the policy
of appeasement. Despite these divergent views, however, it is probably fair to say that
most historians accept that Chamberlain and other British leaders suffered significant
misperceptions, particularly of German intentions. As Jervis writes, "Almost all accounts
agree that some French and many British leaders misperceived Hitler, thinking that his
aim was only to review the most objectionable parts of the Treaty of Versailles."' 3 2 There
is probably less agreement on what difference those misperceptions, manifested in the
form of appeasement, made to the eventual outcome, but a sizeable proportion of
mainstream scholarship does suggest that British and French policy would have been
better, in some way or other, if the western powers had more accurately perceived
German intentions and hence adopted a more forceful stance. Yaacov Vertzberger writes,
"Had France and Britain taken a decisive stand toward Hitler and Germany in the 1930's
would not World War II have been prevented?"' 3 3 Other authors argue that deterring
Hitler was impossible, but even so, "most scholarly accounts of the 1930s conclude that
appeasement was an error because it allowed Hitler to grow stronger".34 P.M.H. Bell, for
instance, argues that if France had intervened in the Rhineland crisis, war would likely
131 Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", 172.
132 Robert Jervis, "Political Science Perspectives", in eds. Robert Boyce and Joseph Maiolo, The Origins of
World War Two. The Debate Continues (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 220.
133 Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 349.
134 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 223.
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have broken out but "this war would have been fought in more favourable military
circumstances than the later one; and if the French had shown boldness and determination
it could surely have been won."'3 5 Robert Beck - who emphatically rejects the extreme
view of Chamberlain as deluded and weak-willed - nonetheless believes that "if
Chamberlain had stood firm [at Munich]...Hitler might have been removed from power,
or what is far more likely, war with Germany might have been fought under more
favorable circumstances than those of 1939." 136
Because most scholars agree that misperceptions suffered by British leaders made
a tangible and negative difference to British policymaking, then, it is worth asking
whether psychological bias theory could have made a positive contribution to foreign
policy in 1930s.
Explanation
Consistent with our earlier discussion of the Korean War, I briefly note that
psychological bias theory appears capable of (at least partially) explaining the
misperceptions suffered by British leaders in the 1930s.
The influence of recent historical analogies - psychological bias B2 - led
British leaders to be inordinately wary of the dangers of spirals of hostility and hence
overly focused on conciliatory diplomacy. Many British leaders who lived through the
First World War believed that that conflict had been caused more by fear and security
135 Bell, Origins of the Second World War, 236.
136 Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", 188. See also Williamson Murray, "Britain", in eds. Robert
Boyce and Joseph Maiolo, The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues (Hampshire: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2003), 122. Murray writes: "In every respect Munich was a strategic disaster for the Western
Powers. In the autumn of 1938 the military situation was still relatively favourable to them. Whatever the
weakness of their air defences, they faced little threat from a Luftwaffe which was running 50 per cent in
commission rates through summer 1938 and which possessed no capability to execute blind bombing
attacks against either French or British cities. Moreover, Germany possessed only three Panzer divisions,
so that the Wehrmacht was not in a position to launch a decisive campaign against the French army."
However, see Overy, Origins of the Second World War, 71, for a competing view.
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concerns than any deep-seated incompatibility. Thus, they believed that the next war
could be averted by level-headed diplomacy and reasonable concessions.3 7 The powerful
force of recent history, unfortunately, made British leaders less sensitive to the possibility
that there might be a genuine clash of interests between Germany and Britain, and that
Hitler might be a committed - and hence implacable - aggressor.
The influence ofpre-existing beliefs - psychological bias B1 - can help explain
why the British image of Germany as a state with only limited revisionist intentions
persisted even in the face of discrepant information, such as Hitler's increasingly bold
demands despite asserting each time that his current demand would be his last. As Jervis
writes, "The benign image of Hitler was hard to dislodge. Many of his actions showed his
aggressiveness only to those who already believed him to be so."'38
Motivated bias also appears to play a role in explaining the case, especially the
tendency to avoid seeing value trade-offs (B9). British leaders in the 1930s had three
principal goals: to maintain Britain's security, to preserve the peace, and to safeguard the
domestic economy (especially by minimizing the tax burden). This combination of values
biased British policymakers against the possibility that the only way to maintain her
security was to allocate scarce resources for rearmament and be prepared for war,
because admitting such a possibility would mean acknowledging a clash between those
three values.
As noted earlier, from a practical perspective, a theory's prescriptive ability is
more important than its explanatory powers. Thus, I turn to the question of whether the
prescriptions of psychological bias theory could have improved decisionmaking in this
137 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 267; Jervis, "Political Science Perspectives", 220.
138 Jervis, "Political Science Perspectives", 220.
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case. If British leaders in the 1930s had been students of psychological bias theory, would
they have been able to make better decisions?
Prescription
If psychological biases are (at least partially) responsible for the misperceptions
suffered by British leaders in the 1930s, then it does seem that the prescriptions of
psychological bias theory could have helped British policymakers.
If Chamberlain had explicitly laid out the assumptions and reasoning
(prescription P3) behind his view that Hitler would be satisfied with limited gains in
Europe - i.e. that Hitler's only aims were to reverse the more unfair clauses of
Versailles and unite all Germans in a single state - he may have been more sensitive to
information that indicated the opposite conclusion (because making explicit one's
reasoning entails, among other things, considering what evidence would contradict one's
views). For instance, Chamberlain might have taken more notice of Hitler' s frequent
violations of his promises, especially those in which he claimed that he would be satiated
if his current demand was met. As Charles Webster notes, "Chamberlain came away from
the meeting [at Berchtesgaden on 15 September 1939] with the impression that [Hitler]
was a man to be trusted to keep his word. He seems to have forgotten how many times it
had already been broken."' 39 Chamberlain may also have been more sensitive to
evidence that apparently revealed Hitler's expansionist ambitions in Europe. As R.J.
Overy writes, "There were plenty of warnings, from a wide variety of official and
unofficial sources, that Hitler's ambitions were without limit, unpredictable and
139 Charles Webster, "Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy", International Affairs 37:2 (Apr.
1961), 146.
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dangerous." 140 The use of devils' advocates (prescription P2) could have added to this
increased alertness to data that would have challenged the settled image of Germany as
essentially a status quo power with only limited demands.
It seems likely that British leaders would have benefited from awareness of
processes that often lead to misperception (prescription P1). If they had been aware of
the formidable influence of historical analogies, they may have been more conscious that
they were powerfully swayed by their recent experience with World War I, and
questioned whether that case was really an appropriate guide to the current one. World
War I, as they saw it, grew out of illusory incompatibility; if they had been aware of the
influence of historical analogies, they may have examined more diligently whether the
incompatibility of the 1930s was more real than that of the 191 Os.
Awareness of the tendency to focus excessively on one 's own frame of reference
could also have proved useful. One important reason that the British acquiesced to
Germany at Munich was because British and France leaders failed to see that Hitler's
frame of reference at the conference was very different from their own. From the British
and French point of view, the surrender of the Sudetenland was tolerable because they
accepted that Central Europe was largely within the German sphere of influence; Eastern
Europe - Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania - was, however, a different matter, and the
western powers were determined not to allow German trespassing there. Unfortunately,
this frame of reference was not shared by Hitler, who instead "came to assume that he
had been given at Munich a green light for expansion in eastern Europe."'14 If
Chamberlain and his colleagues had given more thought to the possibility that the
140 Overy, Origins of the Second World War, 20-21.
141 Ibid., 64.
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German frame of reference was different from their own, they may have stood firm at
Munich in order to signal their intention not to let him go further.
Difficulties
However, the present case - like the previous one - also reveals significant
difficulties with straightforwardly applying the prescriptions of psyc.hological bias theory
to British policymaking in the 1930s.
First, there is the problem of ambiguous data. British policymakers in the 1930s
faced a situation of enormous uncertainty. As numerous commentators have argued, it is
only with hindsight that many of Hitler's actions appear clearly as evidence of his
aggressive intentions. Jervis, besides emphasizing the role of psychological biases, also
acknowledges that
part of the explanation for [British leaders' misperception] lies in the ambiguous nature of the
evidence available to them. Only hindsight makes the pattern in Hitler' s policies appear clear;
until he moved against the non-German parts of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 one could easily
believe that his aim was only to embrace all Germans within the Reich. 14 2
Those keen on criticizing Chamberlain for the outcome of Munich should remember that
on his return to Britain he was greeted by cheering throngs and countless letters from
well-wishers, who were convinced that Chamberlain had made the right decision. As
Overy writes, "Though with hindsight we might conclude that something vital had been
at stake in the Czech crisis, it was not immediately obvious in 1938, when Chamberlain
was universally hailed as the saviour of peace." 143
Arguably, then, the data available to British policymakers at the time were
underdetermining. In other words, the signals given off by Hitler were consistent with
142 Jervis, "Political Science Perspectives", 220.
'43 Overy, Origins of the Second World War, 30.
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two competing theories: one, that he was the satiable leader of a status quo power with
only limited revisionist aims, and two, that he was implacable head of an uncontainable
state with wide expansionist goals. Now, this does not necessarily mean that both
theories were equally well-supported by the evidence. It may very well have been the
case that the evidence more strongly supported the image of Hitler as unappeasable
aggressor. But the evidence was at least consistent with the opposite image. This means
that even if Chamberlain and other British leaders had suffered from no psychological
biases, they may still have been unable to determine Hitler's intentions with certainty.
Of course, much of this ambiguity was propagated, with great skill, by Hitler
himself. As Robert Beck notes, "[Chamberlain's] diplomatic opponent, Adolf Hitler, was
exceedingly shrewd and inscrutable, a master of bluff and deception."'44 The German
leader would alternate between fiery rattling of his saber and earnest declarations of
peace, between repeated breaches of Germany's Versailles obligations and earnest
promises that each breach would his last. As R.R. Palmer et al. put it, "[Hitler]...would
rage and rant, arouse the fear of war, take just a little, declare that it was all he wanted, let
the former Allies naively hope that he was now satisfied and that peace was secure; then
rage again, take a little more, and proceed through the same cycle."145 Even without the
influence of psychological biases, Hitler's masterly use of deception means that it would
have been difficult for British leaders to perceive his intentions with full confidence.
Second, the case throws into doubt whether awareness of common misperceptions
(as distinct from awareness of processes that lead to misperceptions) is useful at all.
Many of the common misperceptions identified by psychological bias theory did not hold
144 Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", 187.
145 Palmer, Colton, and Kramer, History of the Modern World, 803.
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- in fact, the reality of the situation was the opposite of many of these common
misperceptions. It is common for a state to underestimate the extent to which it appears
threatening to other states, but in the present case, if anything, Britain overestimated the
extent to which its posture was frightening to Germany. Germany had an entrenched
image of Britain as weak and irresolute, an image that continued (erroneously) even after
Britain decided in March-September 1939 that she would fight if Germany attacked
Poland. Two days before Germany attacked Poland, Chamberlain sent a note to Hitler
which he thought strongly demonstrated Britain's determination to fight; Hitler, however,
interpreted the missive as placatory and conciliatory. 146 As another example, states often
overestimate the degree to which other governments are centralized. But if British leaders
had taken note of this tendency and tried to correct for it by seeing Germany as possibly
decentralized, they would have made an error, since Hitler exerted immense personal
authority over the German state.
Third, Hitler himself suffered from significant misperceptions of the western
powers. After Munich, as already mentioned, Hitler made a "costly miscalculation" in
thinking that he had been given carte blanche in Eastern Europe, and in particular, that he
could invade Poland without risking general war. 147 He consistently underestimated
Britain and France's resolve.'48 He also greatly underestimated the western allies'
military strength and economic potential.'49 The fact that Hitler himself suffered from
serious misperceptions means that even if Britain and France had accurately perceived
146 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 59.
147 Overy, Origins of the Second World War, 62.
148 Jervis notes, "Hitler underestimated his adversaries' determination. During the summer of 1939 he
doubted whether Britain would fight and, in the spring of 1940, expected her to make peace." Jervis, "War
and Misperception", 682.
149 Overy, Origins of the Second World War, 80.
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Germany's aggressive tendencies, the eventual outcome may still have been suboptimal.
Many scholars, for instance, argue that Hitler could have been deterred if the western
powers had recognized Hitler's aggressiveness early on and hence taken a tougher line.
But this may not have been possible if Hitler was trapped in his own underestimations of
Britain and France.
Fourth, examination of the case highlights the fact that certain psychological
biases may sometimes be useful - and thus, correction of them undesirable. In
particular, theory-driven thinking (bias B1) means that statesmen will often maintain their
beliefs even in the face of discrepant information that would seem to indicate the error of
those beliefs. But one could argue that it is sensible to adopt a conservative attitude and
not let one's beliefs react too easily to discrepant information. As Jervis says of
Chamberlain and his colleagues, "Their cognitive processing was neither unusual nor
pathological. It is sensible to require extraordinary evidence before one reaches an
implausible conclusion. Just as doctors are rarely quick to diagnose obscure diseases, so
the Allied leaders were understandably slow to appreciate what they faced."'5° This
conservative attitude may be particularly useful when changing one's beliefs would have
serious, costly implications such as war. Accepting evidence of another state's hostility
too readily may precipitate an unnecessary war. Thus, even though theory-driven
thinking can sometimes cause misperception, the opposite error - allowing one's beliefs
to be hypersensitive to every bit of discrepant information - may be just as bad, or even
worse. We must be cautious, then, when trying to rectify processes that commonly lead to
misperceptions.
150 Jervis, "Political Science Perspectives", 220-221.
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Lessons of the cases
In each of the cases above, policymakers suffered from significant misperceptions
that negatively impacted the quality of their decisionmaking, which in turn led to foreign
policy outcomes that, in hindsight, appear to be suboptimal. If psychological bias theory
is right, those misperceptions had much to do with various psychological biases to which
leaders were subject. It seemed at first glance that the prescriptions offered by
psychological bias theory could have helped policymakers to produce better outcomes.
But closer examination revealed two difficulties with the straightforward application of
those prescriptions.
1. Ambiguity
First, and most important, is the inherent ambiguity of international politics. In
most situations that a policymaker will face, the available information will not clearly
demonstrate the truth of one particular theory (e.g. that an opponent is hostile and
expansionist). In other words, the data that is available at the time will almost certainly
be underdetermining, i.e. consistent with at least two competing theories. As Richard
Betts writes, "Intelligence can fail because the data are too permissive for policy
judgment...There is usually some evidence to support any prediction."51 This point is
often missed by commentators who look back on historical cases and condemn past
leaders for making decisions on the basis of theories that appeared plainly contradicted
by the available evidence; if we remove the benefit of hindsight, the evidence is often
much less clear than such critics contend. As Jervis argues, "In retrospect, one can always
151 Richard Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable", World Politics
31:1 (Oct. 1978), 70-71.
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find numerous instances in which decision-makers who were wrong overlooked or
misunderstood evidence that now stands out as clear and important. But one can also
note...that many facts supported the conclusion that turned out to be wrong."'52
In particular, there are serious difficulties involved in trying to determine the
intentions of another state. Most of the time, the conduct of a state can plausibly be
accounted for by competing theories of that state's intentions. Jervis writes, "Few actions
are unambiguous. They rarely provide proof of how the state plans to act in the future." 53
The ambiguity of states' actions vis-A-vis their intentions is compounded by the fact that
states usually have great incentives to deceive - and, from a realist perspective, face few
constraints in doing so. An aggressive state may wish to lull its opponents into thinking
that it is peaceful in order to gain the advantage of military surprise (especially useful in
the nuclear age), or to win concessions from other states by pretending it only has limited
demands (as Hitler did). A state that is unwilling to fight, on the other hand, may wish to
deceive others into thinking that it is prepared to take military action, in order to deter
another state from acting, compel another state to do certain things, or to gain a
reputation as a state that is willing to fight to protect its interests. Robert Beck comments,
"[The] ability to hoodwink one's opponent is a prerequisite for the successful
diplomat".154 From a realist perspective - i.e., assuming that states do not follow norms
for their own sake - there are few significant constraints to prevent states from lying.
Perhaps the only important constraint is a state's wish to avoid, for strategic reasons, the
152 Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception", 25.
153 Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1970), 9.
154 Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered", 188.
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reputation of a liar.155 However, the skilful deceiver can get around this by being honest
most of the time, thus building up a reputation as a truth-teller, and only lying when it
really matters.
There are, of course, methods that policymakers can, and do, use to estimate other
states' intentions and hence predict their actions. They can, for instance, assume that
other states are unitary and rational actors whose primary motivations are to further their
national interests. But this method is problematic. National interest, for example, is often
interpreted differently by different officials within a government, so knowing that a state
will act according to its national interest often does not allow for confident predictions.56
Another strategy is to try and look at each state individually and ascertain how its leaders
see the world - in other words, to determine those leaders' operational code, which
includes their "beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, [their] views
regarding the extent to which the historical developments can be shaped, and [their]
notions of correct strategy and tactics." 157 But, as Alexander George admits, it is difficult
to construct these models, and even with a reasonably accurate model of an opponent's
behavioral style, one may still fail to predict its intentions in a given situation (such as the
US's failure to foresee the Soviet deployment of missiles in Cuba in 1962). In short,
ascertaining another state's intentions remains "a difficult task at best."15 8
Even if one could somehow be confident about another state's intentions at a
given time and sure that that state was not lying, there is the problem of changing
155 See Jervis, The Logic of Images, 70-83.
156 George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 67, 219. George writes: "National interest has the characteristics
of what decision theorists refer to as a 'nonoperational goal'; it does not provide a measuring rod for
comparing alternative policies."
157 Alexander George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders
and Decision-Making", International Studies Quarterly 13:3 (Jun. 1969), 197.
158 George, Presidential Decisionmaking, 66-70.
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intentions. As we saw in the Korean War case, intentions often change rapidly during
crises. Over the longer term, states can also change their intentions, i.e. an expansionist
state can become a status quo one, and vice versa. (Though perhaps long-term changes
are somewhat less of a problem than short-term changes because they are easier to track.)
Because states change their intentions, even if one accurately perceives another state's
intentions at a given time, this knowledge may be outdated by the time one actually
formulates policy toward that state.
2. Opponents' misperceptions
In addition to the inevitable "fog of foreign policy making"' 5 9, a second difficulty
that emerged from our study of the two cases is that one's opponents can also suffer
misperception. Sometimes, as in the Korean War case, an opponent may suffer
misperceptions about relative capabilities. At other times, as in the World War II
example, an opponent may misperceive one's intentions. The fact that one's adversary
might suffer misperceptions means that correcting one's misperceptions may not produce
a better foreign policy outcome.
What these problems imply
The difficulties highlighted above have two implications for the utility of
psychological bias theory's prescriptions.
First, the difficulties imply that awareness of common misperceptions is unlikely
to be of much use - at least not directly. If a policymaker knows, for example, that
statesmen are often prone to exaggerate the hostility of other states, he would not be able
to thereby downgrade his estimates of a particular opponent's hostility, because, given
the inherent ambiguity in the international system, he would not know whether this
159 Jervis, Perception and Misperception, 113.
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particular misperception obtained in the present situation. A possible reply is that if one
knows that states overestimate their opponents' hostility more than 50% of the time, then
it is in some ways rational for leaders to always start off by assuming that they are
overestimating their opponents' hostility, pending additional data. But this time of
'rationality' is unlikely to be very assuring to policymakers who must worry about the
formidable danger of incorrectly labeling expansionist powers as status quo ones.
Of course, this point should not surprise us too much. Looking at psychological
bias theory generally (as opposed to specifically in IR), it is clear that mere awareness of
common misperceptions is not very useful in correcting psychological biases. For
example, behavioral scientists widely agree that people are subject to 'status quo' bias160,
but merely knowing this is of little direct utility because in some circumstances, the status
quo actually is superior to alternatives.
Insofar as awareness of psychological bias theory is concerned, then, it is more
important for policymakers to be aware of processes that commonly lead to
misperceptions than for them to know about common misperceptions per se. This
suggests that if psychological bias theory is useful, it will likely be for preventing
misperceptions from forming in the first place rather than correcting misperceptions that
have already formed.
Second, and more importantly, the indelible ambiguity of the international system
and the possibility of opponents' misperception means that even if all psychological
biases are removed (by following the prescriptions of psychological bias theory), there is
160 Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa, "Hidden Traps in Decision Making", 149; Gary Belsky and Thomas
Gilovich, Why Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes - and How to Correct Them: Lessons from the
New Science of Behavioral Economics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 91-96.
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no guarantee that a positive foreign policy outcome will result. This can be seen in the
following diagram:
Fig. 2. Intervening factors between biases and foreign policy outcomes
Psychological biases, according to psychological bias theory, affect the quality of
decisionmaking, so reducing psychological biases in a state's leaders should improve the
quality of decisionmaking in that state. Ceteris paribus, this would reduce the number of
misperceptions suffered by the state. But the amount of misperception is also affected by
the availability of information; sometimes information will be readily available and
helpful while at other times it will be murky and underdetermining.1 61 So reducing
psychological biases does not always reduce misperception. In turn, reducing
misperception does not always translate into a better foreign policy outcome for the state,
because that outcome is influenced not only by one's own misperceptions, but also those
of one's opponent.
This shows that no method of decisionmaking - including those that are free
from psychological biases - can guarantee that a state will always make the choices that
result in the best foreign policy outcomes. Good decisionmaking procedures will
161 An alternative way of stating this is to say that misperceptions are sometimes caused by biases, and at
other times by opacity in the international system. I am grateful to Stephen Van Evera for this suggestion.
See Van Evera, More Causes of War.
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sometimes lead to disastrous foreign policy outcomes, while defective decisionmaking
can occasionally result in favorable outcomes. As Jervis writes, "Errors are inevitable in
light of the difficulty of assessing technological and organizational capabilities, the
obstacles to inferring others' intentions correctly, [and] the limitations on people's ability
to process information." 162 In short, the prescriptions of psychological bias theory cannot
completely eliminate misperception, and even if they could, they would not be able to
ensure positive outcomes.
What these problems do not imply
Of course, the impossibility of eliminating misperceptions and ensuring foreign
policy success does not mean that psychological bias theory is devoid of practical utility.
If the theory's prescriptions can lead to even a moderate reduction in misperception, then
it would already be immensely useful to policymakers. Even if the quality of information
and the amount of opponent's misperception varies from case to case, statesmen are
likely to achieve better outcomes than they would have otherwise by following the
prescriptions of psychological bias theory (assuming that those prescriptions do reduce
biases). In other words, even if it is impossible to eliminate errors resulting from bias-
induced misperceptions, it is possible to assuage them. As Yaacov Vertzberger writes,
"The complete avoidance of faulty information processing is practically impossible...yet
a great deal can be done and measures can and should be taken to limit the extent of
faulty information processing." 63
Aside from simply reducing the extent of misperception suffered by
policymakers, psychological bias theory can prove useful by helping states to limit the
162 Jervis, "War and Misperception", 699.
163 Vertzberger, World in Their Minds, 356.
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negative impact of misperceptions. Vertzberger argues, "Concentrating solely on the
almost impossible task of completely preventing misperceptions should be avoided. More
specifically, decisionmakers must concentrate on dealing with the outcomes of
misperceptions."'6 4 An important way of reducing the negative effect of misperception is
to construct one's policies under the assumption that misperceptions will probably occur.
Statesmen should continuously bear in mind that they may hold incorrect belief -
particularly about the intentions of other states - and thus "design policies that will not
fail disastrously even if they are based on incorrect assumptions." 165 In other words,
state leaders should formulate policies that have a wide margin of error. Of course, this is
much easier said than done and, as Jervis notes, "neither decision-makers nor academics
have fully come to grips" with how to engineer such policies. Nonetheless, the principle
is clear: if psychological bias theory is right, statesmen should take a skeptical view of
their own cognitive abilities and craft their policies accordingly. (On an individual level,
cognitive psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tverksy, who pioneered cognitive
bias theory, argued that recognizing the limitations of our cognitive abilities was the
principal way in which people can cope with cognitive biases.166)
In addition to recognizing their own cognitive limits, policymakers should
recognize that their opponents may suffer from psychological biases and misperceptions.
Such recognition can lead to significant changes in the way that foreign policy is
conducted. In particular, statesmen should at least recognize that the signals that they
send to other states may not be interpreted in the way that the sending state intended.
164 Ibid., 360. Italics added.
165 Jervis, "War and Misperception", 686.
166 see Matlin, Cognition, 446.
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Methods for further research
The discussion above largely centered on speculative and counterfactual
considerations. In examining the two historical cases, we asked whether state leaders
would have been able to achieve better foreign policy if they have followed the
prescriptions of psychological bias theory. In this section, I discuss further research
methods that could be used to investigate the utility of psychological bias theory.
How useful have the prescriptions been?
An obvious and important way of analyzing how useful these prescriptions are is
to investigate how useful they have been for foreign-policymakers. In other words, to
what extent have such prescriptions improved the decisionmaking processes of foreign-
policymakers? This is an empirical question. At present, it does not appear to me that
there are any major studies that systematically examine whether, and to what extent,
prescriptions designed to reduce psychological bias have enhanced the quality of
decisions made by foreign-policymakers. I suspect that this may be because governments
have rarely adopted procedures to purposely improve their decisionmaking abilities
through reducing bias.16 7 If this is true, then it would be difficult to study how effective
prescriptions to reduce psychological bias have been in improving foreign-policymaking.
I may be wrong here. It is possible that there are numerous cases in which
governments have actively taken measures to reduce psychological bias. In any case, it
167 One exception, already mentioned, was Marshall Schulman's analytical methods during the SALT II
negotiations. (see fn. 114)
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would be worth asking how we would design a study to examine whether such measures
have improved decisionmaking.
Intuitively, it seems that we would want to investigate the relationship between
the establishment of such measures and the success of states' foreign policy. The first
question that arises is whether we can meaningfully measure success in foreign policy. It
is, of course, sometimes unclear whether a particular international incident represents a
success or failure for a state that participated in that incident. But there are likely ways to
surmount this problem, albeit imperfectly. One method, used by Gregory Herek, Irving
Janis, and Paul Huth, is to survey scholars who are qualified to comment on a particular
case, in order to seek a consensus view on whether that case was a relative success or
failure for the state in question. 168 Of course, this method has its shortcomings, but is
probably acceptable for our purposes. Assuming that there is a more or less adequate
metric of foreign policy success, then, how would we investigate the relationship between
that success and measures to reduce psychological bias?
One possible method would be to look at cases in which measures to reduce
psychological bias were followed by more successful foreign policies. In other words, we
could conduct longitudinal studies to try and determine the efficacy of such measures.
But as Robert Putnam reminds us, when we are evaluating the effectiveness of a
government measure, we must distinguish between what happened after the measure was
implemented (outcome) and what effects the measure actually caused (output).' 69 For
example, the implementation of a particular economic policy may be followed by robust
168 Gregory Herek, Irving Janis, and Paul Huth, "Decision Making During International Crises: Is Quality
of Process Related to Outcome?", The Journal of Conflict Resolution 31:2 (Jun. 1987), 212-213.
169 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993), 65.
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economic performance, but this performance may not be a result of the policy (e.g. it
might be just a normal part of the business cycle). In evaluating the effectiveness of a
measure, we need to look at output rather than outcome. However, this type of study
would not allow us to clearly distinguish output from outcome. In cases where the
implementation of bias-reducing measures is followed by greater foreign policy success,
we could not be sure that the greater success was caused by the measures; conversely, if
the implementation of measures was not followed by greater policymaking success, we
could not be sure that the measures were ineffective. This is because the conditions that
were present before the implementation of the measures are likely to be different from
those that were present after. In particular, the characteristics of the crises encountered by
the state may be considerably different. So for example, if the crises faced by the
decisionmaker after the implementation of the measures are much more intractable than
those before (because of greater ambiguity, a more deceptive opponent, etc.), there may
be no noticeable improvement in the success of policies even if the measures per se were
efficacious.
A different strategy would be to compare the effect of such measures across
states. Specifically, we would look at a number of similar states, some of which have
adopted measures to reduce psychological bias, and some of which have not, then
investigate whether there is a positive and significant correlation between states' adoption
of such measures and the level of success in foreign policy. One difficulty with this
strategy is the inherent ambiguity of the international system. As discussed earlier, the
quality of decisionmaking is only one factor in determining the success of foreign policy;
the availability of information and the amount of misperception suffered by one's
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opponents also affect whether or not a positive outcome obtains. So even if certain
measures to reduce psychological biases are effective, there is no guarantee that they will
coincide with successful policy outcomes. This raises doubt about whether
straightforward correlational studies between, on the one hand, bias-reducing measures
and, on the other, foreign policy success will tell us whether those measures are
efficacious. One way of getting around this difficulty is to assume that the effects of the
other two factors - availability of information and others' misperceptions - will be
cancelled out once all the cases are examined together; however, it is unclear whether
such an assumption is warranted (especially since the number of cases is likely to be
relatively small).
A more promising strategy is to establish a set of criteria for what constitutes
good decisionmaking, and then judge measures designed to reduce psychological bias
against whether or not they enable states' decisionmaking processes to conform more
closely to those criteria. Irving Janis and Leon Mann, for example, present a list of seven
criteria for what they call "vigilant information processing".7 0
But how should such criteria be formulated? Clearly, if such criteria are just
varying ways of stating that psychological biases have been removed, then our
investigation runs the risk of tautology: measures to reduce psychological bias would by
definition conform to these criteria. In order for a set of criteria to be able to tell us
whether measures to reduce psychological biases are actually useful, the criteria
themselves need to be tested against foreign policy success. Herek, Janis, and Huth have
undertaken such an investigation for Janis and Mann's seven-point criteria; according to
this study, there is a positive and significant correlation between conformity to those
170 Janis and Mann, Decision Making, 11.
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criteria and foreign policy success.71 Any measure that enables decisionmaking to
conform more closely to those criteria is - assuming that Herek et al. are right - likely
to be effective in improving foreign policy outcomes for the state.
Can people correct their psychological biases?
In our discussion so far, we have asked whether reducing psychological biases
can improving decisionmaking and hence reduce misperceptions. This presupposes that
psychological biases can be reduced. But it is not at all certain whether this is true. Thus,
if we want to know whether psychological bias theory is useful, it is important to ask
whether psychological biases can be reduced by any significant degree. If they cannot,
then the practical utility of psychological bias theory would be considerably diminished
(though not eliminated, because, as discussed earlier, the theory can be useful by
encouraging decisionmakers to adopt policies with wide margins of error).
Clearly, this is a vast area of psychology that cannot be adequately examined
here. But in any case, it does not appear that there is any clear consensus within the field
on the extent to which it is possible to remove psychological biases. Some cognitive
psychologists are pessimistic about whether we can reduce biases at all. Others are
guardedly optimistic: for example, Baruch Fischhoff, in a oft-cited review of debiasing
research, reports that certain intensive training programs have had moderate success in
reducing biases; significantly, these training programs not only informed participants of
common biases that impair decisionmaking, but also gave them feedback about the
quality of their decisionmaking. Nonetheless, Fischhoff emphasizes that biases remain
fairly robust, implying that debiasing remains difficult.172
171 Herek, Janis, Huth, "Decision Making During International Crises".
172 Baruch Fischhoff, "Debiasing" (fn. 82).
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One relevant consideration is the relative importance of motivated and
unmotivated biases vis-A-vis foreign-policymaking. As Philip Tetlock notes,
psychologists who emphasize the importance of motivated biases are more likely to be
optimistic about the prospects of reducing biases, because a large part of the motivation
that underlie such biases come from organizational culture and structure, which are easier
to modify than individual cognition.1 73 Thus, the extent to which biases afflicting foreign-
policymakers can be reduced may depend on whether motivated or unmotivated biases
are more important in foreign-policymaking.
In any case, pending further developments in psychology, it would perhaps be
best to join Tetlock in his declared position of agnosticism.
Should policymakers attempt to correct their biases?
A third area for further research is the question of whether statesmen should
attempt to correct their biases. There are three related considerations here.
First, some psychological biases may be useful in themselves, in certain
circumstances. For example, as Tetlock and James Goldgeier note, one could make a case
that the overconfidence bias (which we have not discussed here) is useful in negotiations
because it can help convince an adversary of one's firmness and resolve.' 74 Such possible
utility, then, must be kept in mind if we are deciding whether to remove a particular bias.
Second, some psychological biases may be tolerable if the opposite error is worse.
Even if biases are correctible, it is likely that corrective methods would be imprecise
enough to allow for occasional over-correction, i.e. result in the opposite error being
173 Philip Tetlock, "Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World
Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?", American Journal of Political Science 43:2 (Apr.
1999), 363.
174 Philip Tetlock and James Goldgeier, "Human Nature and World Politics: Cognition, Identity, and
Influence", International Journal of Psychology 35:2 (2000), 90.
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made. If the opposite error is worse - and, as we saw, Chamberlain's hyposensitivity to
data was arguably a case of this - then it may not be worthwhile to correct such a bias.
Third, partial correction of biases may be worse than no correction because such
remedial measures may lead to overconfidence on the part of decisionmakers to whom
such measures are applied. Because of the difficulties in debiasing judgement, it is almost
certain that there will be a period of time when biases are only partially corrected; indeed,
some biases may never be fully corrected. But such partial debiasing may actually
decrease a policymaker's overall decisionmaking capabilities by excessively boosting his
confidence about those capabilities. This is nicely illustrated by an experiment in which
subjects who were given a little clinical training in judging others' psychological states
actually made more errors in such judgements than they had before the training. 75 Thus,
potential overconfidence effects must be borne in mind when considering whether to
institute measures to reduce a particular bias. As Fischhoff writes, "A debiasing
procedure may be more trouble than it is worth if it increases people's faith in their
judgmental abilities more than it improves the abilities themselves." 76
Conclusion
Psychological bias theory appears to offer powerful explanations of state
behavior, accounting for many actions that seem anomalous from a purely rational point
of view. The theory also appears to offer useful prescriptions for policymakers. As we
have seen, there are limits to this utility. Even if the prescriptions are followed, there is
no guarantee that misperceptions will disappear - and even if misperceptions did
175 Stuart Oskamp, "Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments", Journal of Consulting Psychology 29
(1965), 261-265. Discussed in Jervis, "Deterrence and Perception", 20.
176 Fischhoff, "Debiasing", 431.
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disappear, there is no guarantee that a favorable outcome will obtain for the state. But
nonetheless, the prescriptions of psychological bias theory can help to improve
decisionmaking processes, reduce misperception, and increase the likelihood of achieving
a favorable outcome for the state. Psychological bias theory is also potentially useful
because it can encourage leaders to formulate policies which take into account the fact
that their beliefs may be wrong. The theory, therefore, is worthy of continued attention
from policymakers and academics alike.
80
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